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COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM AND SIJS 
SHANI M. KING* 
NICOLE SILVESTRI HALL** 
Abstract: Recognizing the plight of young immigrants who have suffered abuse, 
neglect, or abandonment, and cannot be reunited with a parent, Congress has ac-
corded those who qualify Special Immigrant Juvenile Status (SIJS). SIJS has cre-
ated an expedited path for them to permanent residency and, ultimately, citizen-
ship. The statutory scheme Congress crafted is unusual in that it requires each 
applicant to obtain a state court order finding that they meet the requirements for 
SIJS before the United States Citizenship and Immigration Service decides 
whether to confer that status on them. The implementation of this scheme has 
been fraught with difficulty, representing for some a challenge to federal control 
over immigration and representing for others an impermissible encroachment on 
state sovereignty. That it does both symbolizes that Congress reached a pragmatic 
compromise that acknowledges the interdependence of the federal government 
and the states, as well as the shared and overlapping interests each have in young 
and vulnerable immigrants. In this Article, we examine the structure of the SIJS 
statutory scheme and the roles of state and federal actors contemplated therein. 
We review relevant principles of federalism, plenary powers, and the exceptional 
treatment of immigration laws within the federalism framework. Using these 
principles, we then consider the responses of states that have sought to broaden 
or restrict access to SIJS. Finally, we consider the potential for a cooperative 
model of federalism to help resolve tensions and correct misunderstandings sur-
rounding the SIJS statute. It is just such a pragmatic approach, which accepts the 
interactive and interdependent relationships between the federal government and 
the states, that allows us to best make sense of the SIJS statute. We suggest that 
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this approach can accommodate the SIJS statute as a legal hybrid that addresses 
the issues of immigration where they lie: both at the external federal borders and 
within those borders in the several states. 
INTRODUCTION 
Ana Herrera was eighteen years old when she arrived in the United States, 
having fled her native El Salvador out of desperation after witnessing the mur-
der of her cousin and knowing her own life was at risk because the gang perpe-
trators saw her witness the crime.1 Both of Ana’s parents abandoned her when 
she was four months old, and she spent the remainder of her childhood living 
with her grandmother who was very poor and could not afford to adequately 
care for or feed her. Nevertheless, Ana remained in El Salvador and endured 
desolate, often violent conditions and extreme poverty until she witnessed her 
cousin’s murder and felt she had to flee, or she too would be killed.2 
After a long, treacherous journey, Ana arrived at the U.S. border and Im-
migration Control and Enforcement (ICE) detained her shortly thereafter. She 
spent almost two months in detention centers until agents found Ana’s aunt in 
Maryland, and sent Ana to be with her. To prepare for her case in court, Ana 
was required to relive the horrible events of her childhood trauma.3 Fortunate-
ly, Ana qualified for Special Immigrant Juvenile Status (SIJS), which permits 
juveniles who are unable to reunite with their parents due to abuse, abandon-
ment, or neglect, among other criteria, to obtain lawful permanent resident sta-
tus.4 She was even more fortunate because her aunt lived in Maryland, where 
legislators had passed a bill to expand jurisdiction for courts of equity to be 
consistent with federal SIJS age limits, explicitly allowing the courts to take 
jurisdiction over immigrant children up to the age of twenty-one.5 Thus, and 
because she had access to pro bono legal aid, Ana first obtained a state predi-
cate order in a Maryland juvenile state court, then filed a petition with United 
                                                                                                                           
1 Elizabeth Doerr, Young People Traveling Across the Border Alone Are Making It to Maryland—
and Fighting to Stay, BALT. SUN (May 25, 2016), https://www.baltimoresun.com/citypaper/bcp-
062516-feature-ana-profile-20160525-story.html [https://web.archive.org/web/20200919195308/
https://www.baltimoresun.com/citypaper/bcp-062516-feature-ana-profile-20160525-story.html]. 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) (2018) (defining eligibility for SIJS). This Article refers to 8 
U.S.C. § 1101 as the “SIJS Statute.” 
5 MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 1-201 (West 2020); see also In re Dany G., 117 A.3d 650, 655 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2015) (“If the underlying juvenile court filing is properly before the court, state 
courts are required to make [SIJS] factual findings.” (citing Simbaina v. Bunay, 109 A.3d 191 (Md. 
Ct. Spec. App. 2015))). 
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States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to obtain SIJS,6 and fi-
nally, once SIJS was granted, went on to apply for permanent legal residency 
status.7 If her aunt had settled in, and Ana had been relocated to, Kentucky, for 
example, her court case may not even have been heard.8 Ana was able to take 
the quick path to residency that the SIJS statute provided because her aunt 
happened to live in a state that treated SIJS applicants favorably. 
In recent years, unaccompanied children like Ana have been arriving at 
the southern border of the United States in unprecedented numbers, many flee-
ing horrific living conditions and violence in the Central American countries of 
Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador.9 Some have blamed the failures of 
U.S. foreign policy over the past century for the chronic economic and politi-
cal instability these countries experience today.10 Although the drivers of these 
immigration patterns are debatable, the consequences are clear. By creating 
SIJS, Congress has acknowledged and attempted to respond to the human suf-
fering of children abroad by designing a form of relief intended to ameliorate 
that suffering within the borders of the United States. 
The underlying objective of the SIJS statute—the regulation of noncitizen 
entry, exit, and status—is an appropriate exercise of the federal government’s 
plenary power.11 Yet, with the statute, Congress intentionally crafted a coop-
erative process involving the several states to identify children who qualify for 
SIJS relief.12 The first step of this process—fact-finding by a state court that, 
                                                                                                                           
6 Doerr, supra note 1; see I-360, Petition for Amerasian, Widow(er), or Special Immigrant, U.S. 
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/i-360 [https://perma.cc/3FPL-LHZG] [herein-
after Form I-360]. Form I-360 is what juveniles use in order to obtain SIJ status. Form I-360, supra. 
7 Doerr, supra note 1; see KIDS IN NEED OF DEFENSE, CHAPTER 4: SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVE-
NILE STATUS (SIJS) (2015), https://supportkind.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Chapter-4-Special-
Immigrant-Juvenile-Status-SIJS.pdf [https://perma.cc/X8B4-E23R] (describing SIJS generally and 
offering advice on how to apply, including how to move for SIJS predicate order). 
8 See infra Part III (discussing states, including Kentucky, with more restrictive definitions of 
“child” or states that do not require courts to make SIJS factual findings as part of a “best interest” 
determination). 
9 See United States Border Patrol Southwest Family Unit Subject and Unaccompanied Alien 
Children Apprehensions Fiscal Year 2016, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, https://www.cbp.
gov/newsroom/stats/southwest-border-unaccompanied-children/fy-2016 [https://perma.cc/7PJM-3QS3]. 
In 2016, the United States Customs and Border Patrol apprehended 59,692 unaccompanied children 
on the southwest border. Id. Of these children, 17,512 were from El Salvador (29.3%), 18,913 were 
from Guatemala (33.4%), and 10,468 were from Honduras (17.5%). Id. 
10 See, e.g., Mark Tseng-Putterman, A Century of U.S. Intervention Created the Immigration Cri-
sis, MEDIUM (June 20, 2018), https://medium.com/s/story/timeline-us-intervention-central-america-
a9bea9ebc148 [https://perma.cc/39UZ-T3VE] (tracing and discussing the role of the U.S. military 
intervention and policy of economic neoliberalism in undermining democracy and stability in Central 
America, as well as creating vacuums of power where drug cartels and paramilitary alliances could 
thrive). 
11 Kerry Abrams, Plenary Power Preemption, 99 VA. L. REV. 601, 615–16 (2013). 
12 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J). 
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inter alia, the child is under twenty-one years old, has suffered abuse, neglect, 
or abandonment, and cannot be reunited with a parent—is more traditionally 
thought of as a state power.13 The second step, making the determination of 
whether vulnerable children qualify for SIJS relief, is left to the federal gov-
ernment.14 State courts, in other words, simply act in an identifier or filtering 
role by assisting the federal government in finding children who qualify for 
this form of relief, which will propel them more expeditiously along a path to 
permanent residency and, ultimately, citizenship. 
In practice, despite Congress’s intentions, children continue to struggle to 
gain access to state courts for fact-finding purposes. Many states have adopted 
something more akin to a “gatekeeper” function in the framework of SIJS re-
lief. Indeed, although the SIJS statutory scheme contemplated a cooperative 
partnership between federal and state governmental entities, the reality on the 
ground is anything but cooperative: many states refuse to cooperate with the 
SIJS congressional mandate, which results in wildly varying chances of receiv-
ing SIJS depending on the state where the applicant resides.15 More “immi-
grant-friendly” states have enacted legislation or issued rulings from the bench 
that require their courts to make the predicate findings that are required to pro-
cess SIJS applications, and have, where necessary, expanded their jurisdiction 
to ensure that courts make such findings for all potentially eligible SIJS appli-
cants up to the maximum age the SIJS statute permits.16 In contrast, less “im-
                                                                                                                           
13 See id. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i)–(ii). 
14 See id. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(iii). 
15 Gregory Zhong Tian Chen, Elian or Alien? The Contradictions of Protecting Undocumented 
Children Under the Special Immigrant Juvenile Statute, 27 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 597, 604 (2000) 
[hereinafter Chen, Elian or Alien?] (“The law vests power in state courts to make important decisions 
regarding the minors’ needs and requires that the [Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)] rely 
upon those state court decisions. However, by giving state courts significant responsibility for deter-
mining minors’ eligibility for this immigration benefit without clearly defining the roles of the INS 
and state courts in this process, Congress set the stage for conflict between the federal government and 
state governments.”). 
16 See, e.g., In re Y.M., 144 Cal. Rptr. 3d 54, 73 (Ct. App. 2012) (finding that the lower court 
erred in declining to consider a juvenile’s request for SIJS findings); In re J.J.X.C., 734 S.E.2d 120, 
124 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012) (finding that the lower court “had a duty to consider the SIJ factors and make 
findings”); see also infra notes 116–119 and accompanying text (discussing states in which courts 
have found an affirmative duty for state courts to make SIJS factual findings). The SIJS statute per-
mits applications from individuals up to the age of twenty-one and some states have passed legislation 
to ensure that their state courts will make findings for all potentially eligible SIJS applicants up to the 
maximum age. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 1510.1 (West 2020) (empowering California probate 
courts to “appoint a guardian of the person for an unmarried individual who is 18 years of age or old-
er, but who has not yet attained 21 years of age, in connection with a petition to make the necessary 
findings regarding special immigrant juvenile status”); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 1-201(a), 
(b)(10) (providing specifically that, for the purposes of “Special Immigrant Juvenile factual findings,” 
Maryland equity courts have jurisdiction over immigrant children, including “unmarried individual[s] 
under the age of 21 years”). 
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migrant-friendly” states and judges have thwarted access to the SIJS benefit, in 
some cases declining jurisdiction entirely. In other cases, courts are allowed to 
use discretion on whether to make underlying factual findings for an SIJS ap-
plication. When they do decide to make factual findings, they are made only 
incidentally as part of independent proceedings under state law.17 At the feder-
al level, USCIS has recently started to second-guess state court findings and 
jurisdiction.18 Moreover, USCIS policy guidance on SIJS has shifted several 
times since 2018 without clear notice and under the pretense that the guidance 
is merely a “clarification” rather than a formal change to policy.19 
In this Article, we argue that neither USCIS nor the individual states 
should interfere with or block access to the statutory pathway Congress created 
to provide additional expeditious relief for a vulnerable group of immigrant 
children. States should not refuse to make SIJS findings: rather, they are re-
quired to participate, albeit while applying whatever state laws govern a “best-
interests” determination.20 As long as all required information is provided, 
                                                                                                                           
17 See Bernard P. Perlmutter, Judges Behaving Badly . . . Clinics Fighting Back: The Struggle for 
Special Immigrant Juveniles in State Dependency Courts in the Age of Trump, 82 ALBANY L. REV. 
1553, 1555 (2019) (evaluating changing state judicial trends in SIJS cases, using Florida judges and 
caselaw as a field study to evaluate recent polarized attitudes in the state judiciary over immigrant 
children). 
18 See infra notes 126–131 and accompanying text. 
19 Several news agencies have reported on the lack of transparency underlying recent USCIS 
“rule changes” that question state court authority and suggest that state courts lack jurisdiction over 
the custody of applicants over the age of eighteen, and these changes have correlated with a massive 
increase in SIJS application denials. See, e.g., Liz Robbins, A Rule Is Changed for Young Immigrants, 
and Green Card Hopes Fade, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/18/
nyregion/special-immigrant-juvenile-status-trump.html [https://perma.cc/FN6A-5KBC] (investigating 
USCIS’s recent trend to arbitrarily deny SIJS applications when cases with similar sets of facts had 
been approved in the past and reporting that this trend had happened with no change in formal policy 
directive); Ted Hesson, USCIS Explains Juvenile Visa Denials, POLITICO: WEEKLY SHIFT (Apr. 25, 
2018), https://www.politico.com/newsletters/morning-shift/2018/04/25/travel-ban-at-scotus-182935 
[https://perma.cc/ZDN5-QES6] (documenting the USCIS change in policy that called for the agency 
to reject pending SIJS applications to the extent that the applicants could not be returned to the par-
ent’s custody, and reporting on USCIS’s characterization of this policy change as a mere “clarifica-
tion”). This trend serves to undermine state sovereignty to broaden SIJS eligibility to the federal stat-
ute’s maximum age of twenty-one. As this Article goes to print, USCIS has officially adopted a series 
of Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) decisions relating to SIJS, resulting in an update in USCIS 
Policy Manual on November 19, 2019 that, among other things, limits the types of state courts al-
lowed to issue predicate orders and requires a state court to grant some form of relief (involving care 
and custody determinations or the provision of child welfare services or both) before USCIS will issue 
consent to granting SIJS. See, e.g., 6 U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., DEP’T OF HOME-
LAND SECURITY, POLICY MANUAL, ch. 2(C) (Nov. 19, 2019) [hereinafter USCIS POLICY MANUAL]. 
20 Best interest determinations may, indeed, be the purview of state family courts. But a state 
court judge cannot discharge her duty to act in a child’s best interest if she refuses to make SIJS find-
ings entirely. All states use a “best interest of the child” test as the yardstick for making child welfare 
determinations, but states have yet to harmonize a nationally accepted best interests standard. One 
aspect of the best interest calculation, however—consideration of the safety and welfare of children—
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USCIS must accept state court predicate orders, and the jurisdiction that states 
exercise to generate them, at face value.21 
In theory, we propose that SIJS could be an example of a deliberately or-
chestrated legal hybrid that draws on the strengths of state and federal actors 
alike to identify and provide immigration relief to a group of neglected chil-
dren. To that end, the SIJS statute is best conceptualized as a “border” law, 
where congressional exercises of plenary power are more appropriate and less 
likely to be impugned.22 Congress identified the states as the appropriate pro-
cedural vehicle to operationalize an immigration benefit for a group of chil-
dren in need of assistance. But the overarching target of the statute is to regu-
late a core function of immigration. Of course, plenary power is not absolute, 
but the “core” functions of immigration (i.e., admission and removal) are ap-
                                                                                                                           
is uniformly prioritized by all courts. Failure to consider all forms of relief available to protect a 
child’s wellbeing may very well be a failure to act in that child’s best interest, no matter the child’s 
state of residence. The one sub-group of potential SIJS applicants for whom courts in some states may 
be justified in declining to make SIJS predicate findings is those over the age up to which the courts, 
under their respective state laws, are required to make “best interests” findings, but under the maxi-
mum age of SIJS applicants. See, e.g., In re Jimenez, 199 So. 3d 1218, 1220 (La. Ct. App. 2016) (af-
firming the lower court’s ruling that dismissed a petition for SIJS predicate findings because the dis-
trict court did not have juvenile jurisdiction where a Louisiana state law defined children and minors 
as persons under eighteen years of age and petitioner was eighteen when she filed her petition); In re 
J.L.E.O., No. 14-10-00628-CV, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 1342, at *1 (App. Feb. 14, 2011) (affirming a 
lower court ruling that, because the child had turned eighteen, the juvenile court no longer had juris-
diction under section 101.003(a) of the Texas Family Code to make SIJS predicate findings). Some 
states have explicitly expanded the jurisdiction of their courts to permit them to make SIJS predicate 
findings for this particular group of applicants. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 1510.1 (empowering 
California probate courts to “appoint a guardian of the person for an unmarried individual who is 18 
years of age or older, but who has not yet attained 21 years of age, in connection with a petition to 
make the necessary findings regarding special immigrant juvenile status”); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. 
LAW § 1-201(a), (b)(10) (providing specifically that, for the purposes of “Special Immigrant Juvenile 
factual findings,” Maryland equity courts have jurisdiction over immigrant children, including “un-
married individual[s] under the age of 21 years”); see also R.F.M. v. Nielsen, 365 F. Supp. 3d 350, 
366 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (noting that, “although [New York family courts] typically only ha[ve] jurisdic-
tion over juveniles up to age of eighteen, [they] ha[ve] jurisdiction to appoint a guardian over a juve-
nile between ages of eighteen and twenty-one with the juvenile’s consent” (according to section 
661(a) of the New York Family Court Act) and New York courts have held that this establishes juris-
diction to make predicate findings under the SIJS statute (first citing Trudy-Ann W. v. Joan W., 901 
N.Y.S.2d 296, 298 (App. Div. 2010); then citing Antowa McD. v. Wayne McD., 856 N.Y.S.2d 576, 
577 (App. Div. 2008))). 
21 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i)–(ii) (requiring that state courts make certain predicate findings 
and not providing a mechanism for USCIS to dispute those findings). 
22 We borrow from Ming Chen’s characterization of immigration laws operating “at the border” 
and “between borders” to distinguish between exercises of power relating to “core” immigration func-
tions (removal and admission) and thus more appropriate for an exercise of plenary power, and alien-
age laws where plenary power may yield to traditional state powers. Ming H. Chen, Immigration and 
Cooperative Federalism: Toward a Doctrinal Framework, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 1087, 1092–94 
(2011) [hereinafter Chen, Immigration and Cooperative Federalism]. 
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propriate exercises of this power.23 The state’s role, to identify children who 
may qualify for SIJS, is subordinate to Congress’s main objective. Likewise, 
immigration agencies cannot overstep congressionally delegated bounds of 
authority to second-guess the application of state law. 
Part I discusses the general legislative framework within which the SIJS 
statute sits.24 We first provide background on the SIJS statute, showing how 
Congress has broadened access to SIJS since its passage in 1990.25 We then 
discuss the doctrinal “web” at play in immigration matters, and include a dis-
cussion on federalism, preemption principles, immigration exceptionalism, and 
plenary power that we will use to evaluate the different approaches states have 
taken in SIJS matters.26 
In Parts II and III, we outline differing state approaches.27 In Part II, we 
examine state policies, legislative initiatives, and judicial interpretations that 
have attempted to broaden access to SIJS protection in concert with Con-
gress’s evident intent to extend greater protection to a specific group of immi-
grant children.28 We then consider current USCIS policy guidance and trends 
in recent SIJS application rejections.29 We examine the idea that a federal 
agency cannot question or reinterpret state law or jurisdiction and discuss per-
tinent recent cases in California and New York.30 Finally, we explore the im-
plications of immigration agencies second-guessing state laws and state judi-
cial decisions, which represents a significant deviation from Congress’s careful 
design, and introduces unintended variability into the treatment of immigrant 
children depending on who occupies the White House.31 
Part III considers the contingent of states that have sought to reject the fed-
eral mandate to participate in the SIJS scheme and limit access to SIJS protec-
tion.32 We examine the state sovereignty arguments such states have used to jus-
tify their respective refusals to participate in Congress’s cooperative scheme.33 In 
so doing, we argue that the SIJS statute is best understood as having conferred a 
valuable federal right to a subset of eligible, vulnerable children. Rather than 
thinking of SIJS as a federal statute directly requiring state courts or officials to 
act, it is more appropriate to conceptualize the statute as triggering protections 
                                                                                                                           
23 See Abrams, supra note 11, at 603. 
24 See infra notes 37–93 and accompanying text. 
25 See infra notes 40–58 and accompanying text. 
26 See infra notes 59–93 and accompanying text. 
27 See infra notes 94–155 and accompanying text. 
28 See infra notes 94–121 and accompanying text. 
29 See infra notes 122–132 and accompanying text. 
30 See infra notes 133–155 and accompanying text. 
31 See infra notes 133–155 and accompanying text. 
32 See infra notes 156–191 and accompanying text. 
33 See infra notes 156–191 and accompanying text. 
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offered under state law, which spring from the state’s duty to ensure the welfare 
of its residents.34 This view presents a critical distinction when analyzing the 
constitutional viability of Congress’s scheme under the Tenth Amendment.35 
In Part IV, we consider the potential for the application of a cooperative 
model of federalism to help to resolve tensions and correct misapprehensions 
resulting from the unusual structure of the SIJS statute.36 As a legal hybrid, 
SIJS invokes a cooperative approach to an immigration benefit, intended to 
operate both at the borders and between borders. Substantively, SIJS operates 
at the border because SIJS is an immigration benefit that makes admission 
more accessible for a certain group. Procedurally, it operates between borders 
because states can broaden access to the benefit by enlarging protection for 
juveniles in alignment with federal standards. Congress appropriately sought to 
control immigration law at the border by deciding the pathway to naturaliza-
tion for certain vulnerable children. States use powers reserved to them under 
the Constitution to make procedural best-interest determinations for children. 
State legislators can make efforts to align their state laws with federal require-
ments for SIJS, or not. This cooperative system, however, has outer limits; 
states cannot frustrate the intent of Congress nor deny equal protection to SIJS 
litigants. As a hybrid, we offer a “that/how” cooperative federalism distinction 
to guide a litigant through the SIJS application process: that a state court con-
sider SIJS as a form of relief for litigants in state courts is obligatory; how a 
state court proceeds with judicial fact-finding may involve discretion. 
I. ORGANIZING PRINCIPLES 
Section A of this Part provides an overview of the SIJS statute: what it 
says, how it came to be, and how Congress has changed its scope since its in-
ception in 1990.37 Then, in Section B, we discuss the unique aspects of immi-
gration law, including federalism, preemption principles, and the federal plena-
ry power over immigration, and how they impact the application of the SIJS 
statute.38 Finally, Section C discusses the role of implied preemption in inter-
preting and applying the SIJS statute.39 
                                                                                                                           
34 See infra notes 156–191 and accompanying text. 
35 See infra notes 156–191 and accompanying text. 
36 See infra notes 192–217 and accompanying text. 
37 See infra notes 40–58 and accompanying text. 
38 See infra notes 59–77 and accompanying text. 
39 See infra notes 78–93 and accompanying text. 
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A. A Brief History of the SIJS Statute 
Congress first recognized the unique needs of a particularly vulnerable 
group of child immigrants in 1990, when it created a SIJS statutory pathway to 
naturalization. This Section offers a historical framework for the SIJS statute.40 
It begins by describing the initial language of the statute.41 It then explores 
how subsequent amendments changed the scope of the law. 42 
From its inception, SIJS legislation intended to use states as a procedural 
vehicle for making best interest determinations for children, and Congress un-
equivocally enlisted the aid of states to accomplish this objective.43 Congress 
enacted SIJS as a pathway to citizenship in 1990, and identified certain criteria 
that would qualify an immigrant for this form of relief: first, the immigrant 
must be declared “dependent” on a juvenile court in the United States and eli-
gible for long-term foster care and second, an administrative or judicial body 
must determine that it would not be in the individual’s best interest to return to 
their previous country of nationality or residence.44 
                                                                                                                           
40 See infra notes 43–58 and accompanying text; see also Laila L. Hlass, States and Status: A 
Study of Geographical Disparities for Immigrant Youth, 46 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 266, 335–38 
(2014) (succinctly summarizing the evolution of the SIJS statute and how access to SIJS relief has 
been both expanded and restricted over the past three decades). 
41 See infra notes 43–44 and accompanying text. 
42 See infra notes 45–55 and accompanying text. 
43 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J); see also Special Immigrant Status; Certain Aliens Declared De-
pendent on a Juvenile Court; Revocation of Approval of Petitions; Bona Fide Marriage Exemption to 
Marriage Fraud Amendments; Adjustment of Status, 58 Fed. Reg. 42,843, 42,847 (Aug. 12, 1993) 
(confirming that immigration officials would look to the state court determinations of the minor’s best 
interests). See generally Bridgette A. Carr, Incorporating a “Best Interests of the Child” Approach 
into Immigration Law and Procedure, 12 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 120, 156–57 (2009) (noting 
the hybrid nature of SIJS proceedings); Chen, Elian or Alien?, supra note 15, at 611 (discussing rele-
vant capacity and competence of federal and state judiciaries in dealing with individual child welfare 
cases); David B. Thronson, Kids Will Be Kids? Reconsidering Conceptions of Children’s Rights Un-
derlying Immigration Law, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 979, 1005–11 (2002) (discussing the design of the SIJS 
statute and noting that “[t]he statute, recognizing that juvenile courts have particularized training and 
expertise in the area of child welfare and abuse, places critical decisions about the child’s best inter-
ests and the possibility of family reunification with state juvenile courts”). But see Emily Rose Gonza-
lez, Symposium, Student Scholarship, Battered Immigrant Youth Take the Beat, Special Immigrant 
Juveniles Permitted to Age-Out of Status, 8 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 409, 413 (2009) (arguing that bi-
furcated process prejudices SIJS claimants due to imposing delays); Jessica R. Pulitzer, Note, Fear 
and Failing in Family Court: Special Immigrant Juvenile Status and the State Court Problem, 21 
CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 201, 211 (2014) (identifying challenges in SIJS implementation arising 
from state court involvement). 
44 Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 153, 104 Stat. 4978, 5005–06 (1990) (amended 
1997). The Immigration and Naturalization Service issued an interim rule on May 21, 1991, defining 
key terms and requiring juvenile court orders finding the child to be dependent on that court and eligi-
ble for long-term foster care, and evidence of a best interest determination that the child should not be 
“returned to the country of nationality or last habitual residence of the beneficiary or his or her parent 
or parents.” Special Immigrant Status; Certain Aliens Declared Dependent on a Juvenile Court; Bona 
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Shortly after SIJS was enacted, however, Congress passed a few revisions 
to the statute to restrict the number of individuals who could apply. First, Con-
gress directly inserted the Attorney General (AG) into the approval process, 
complicating and lengthening the review process.45 The AG now acted as 
gatekeeper to SIJS relief because the AG had to give consent to jurisdiction of 
a state court over a child in removal proceedings in order for that court to make 
factual findings on SIJS status.46 Second, only those juveniles deemed eligible 
for long-term foster care based on abuse, neglect, or abandonment were now 
eligible for relief, which intentionally limited access to SIJS.47 A year later, in 
1998, USCIS issued guidance clarifying that, for children to be considered for 
SIJS, the Attorney General must review the dependency order and other sup-
porting evidence as a precondition to the grant of status.48 
SIJS requirements and procedure continued to evolve, and in 2004, 
USCIS49 issued guidance to clarify the type of information that should be in-
cluded in state court findings.50 Most importantly, the guidance made clear that 
USCIS should not question state court findings. 51 In pertinent part, the guid-
ance stated: 
The adjudicator generally should not second-guess the court rulings 
or question whether the court’s order was properly issued. Orders 
that include or are supplemented by specific findings of fact as to 
the above-listed rulings will usually be sufficient to establish eligi-
                                                                                                                           
Fide Marriage Exemption to Marriage Fraud Amendments, 56 Fed. Reg. 23,207, 23,208 (proposed 
May 21, 1991) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 101.6(c)(6)). 
45 See Memorandum from Thomas E. Cook, Acting Assistant Comm’r, Adjudications Div., Im-
migration & Naturalization Serv., Special Immigrant Juveniles—Memorandum #2: Clarification of 
Interim Field Guidance (July 9, 1999), https://www.aila.org/infonet/ins-advises-on-special-immigrant-
juveniles [https://perma.cc/ZGP3-FM7P]. 
46 These changes, however, were not immediately accompanied by any guidance for how to re-
quest the Attorney General’s consent. See Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 113, 111 Stat. 2440, 2460–61 
(1997) (amended 2008); Memorandum from Thomas E. Cook, Acting Assistant Comm’r, Immigra-
tion & Naturalization Serv., Interim Field Guidance Relating to Public Law 105-119 (Sec. 113) 
Amending Section 101(a)(27)(J) of the INA—Special Immigrant Juveniles, HQ/70/6.1P (Aug. 7, 
1998) [hereinafter Cook Memo (Aug. 7, 1998)] (“In the past, individuals who did not suffer abuse, 
abandonment, or neglect were known to have sought the court’s protection merely to avail themselves 
of legal permanent resident status. This amendment ensures that this will no longer be possible.”). 
47 See Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 113; see also Cook Memo (Aug. 7, 1998), supra note 46. 
48 See Hlass, supra note 40, at 336. 
49 In 2003, the Homeland Security Act rearranged the INS into multiple bureaus, and USCIS was 
relocated under the newly created Department of Homeland Security. Incidentally, USCIS was briefly 
named the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigrations Services before it took its current name, USCIS.  
50 Memorandum from William R. Yates, Assoc. Dir. for Operations, U.S. Citizenship and Immi-
gration Servs., Memorandum #3—Field Guidance on Special Immigrant Juvenile Status Petitions 5 
(May 27, 2004), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/memos/sij_memo_052704.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2FUR-TMYM] [hereinafter Yates Memo]. 
51 Id. 
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bility for consent. Such findings need not be overly detailed, but 
must reflect that the juvenile court made an informed decision.52 
The 2004 guidance further reiterated strict requirements regarding the re-
quirement of specific consent,53 and discussed the problems surrounding 
youths “aging out”—referring to children who are eligible when they apply for 
SIJS but, due to application processing times or delays, no longer meet the stat-
ute’s age limit of 2154—encouraging advocates to apply in a timely fashion to 
avoid this pitfall.55 Of course, SIJS-eligible youth also run the risk of aging out 
of the jurisdiction of state court before they reach twenty-one years old, depend-
ing on individual states’ respective age limits for juvenile court jurisdiction.56 
After narrowing the SIJS criteria in 1997, Congress in 2008 broadened 
access to SIJS through the Trafficking Victim Protection Reauthorization Act 
(TVPRA). The TVPRA expanded the SIJS definition and made a few major 
changes, including: (1) loosening the requirement that reunification not be via-
ble from applying to both parents to applying to only one parent; (2) expanding 
the grounds for protection by adding the language “or a similar basis found 
under state law” to the requirement that reunification not be viable due to 
abuse, neglect, or abandonment; and (3) removing language requiring the child 
be found eligible for “long-term foster care,” thus expanding potential cover-
age to include children in guardianship, adoption, and custody proceedings.57 
The TVPRA amendments also added protections against aging out by designat-
ing a child’s age at filing as controlling and mandating the adjudication of peti-
tions within six months.58 
                                                                                                                           
52 Id.at 4–5.  
53 Id. at 5 (stating that “[i]f specific consent was necessary but not timely obtained,” the depend-
ency order should be considered invalid and the SIJS application denied). 
54 Id. at 6. 
55 Id. 
56 USCIS POLICY MANUAL, supra note 19, at ch. 2(B). State law is controlling as to whether the 
petitioner is considered a child or any other equivalent term for a juvenile subject to the jurisdiction of 
the state juvenile court for custody or dependency hearings. Id. 
57 See William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. 
No. 110-457, § 235, 122 Stat. 5044, 5074–82 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2018)) (seeking to prevent 
human trafficking, and therefore to protect youth who were still vulnerable and in need of protection, 
even if close to aging out); Hlass, supra note 40, at 337–38; Memorandum from Donald Neufeld, 
Acting Assoc. Dir., Domestic Operations, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servs., Trafficking Vic-
tims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008: Special Immigrant Juveniles Status Provisions, HQOPS 
70/8.5 (Mar. 24, 2009), http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/Static_
Files_Memoranda/2009/TVPRA_SIJ.pdf [https://perma.cc/7UG2-2AG7]. 
58 See Hlass, supra note 40, at 338. Also, the TVPRA amendments eased procedures for children 
currently in the custody of the Office of Refugee Resettlement, and detained children who were ap-
proved for SIJS could be transferred to the Unaccompanied Refugee Minor program to receive social 
services. Id. 
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Despite the changes it has undergone since its creation, the most unusual 
feature of the SIJS statute, and its primary source of conflict and debate, has 
remained its structure, which necessarily requires state and federal action: state 
courts have to make predicate findings in order for the federal USCIS to be 
able to approve SIJS applications. By its terms, the statute cannot operate ef-
fectively without state and federal buy-in. 
B. Federalism and Exceptionalism in Immigration Law 
A debate over the SIJS statutory scheme can either devolve into a concep-
tual debate over the limits of federalism or it can be focused on the details of a 
statutory immigration benefit granted by Congress to young immigrants who 
are both vulnerable and difficult to identify. This Section pinpoints and dis-
cusses both the federalism and immigration-specific principles at play within 
the SIJS scheme.59 It proposes a set of principles that will guide us through the 
remainder of the Article.60 
The Framers of the Constitution envisioned a dual system of government 
that allows the people to throw their weight onto the federal or state side of the 
scale to correct for abuses of government power on either side. But abuse of 
power is not the only reason powers are reserved to the states. Indeed, many 
other benefits accrue from a dual sovereignty structure, including decentralized 
government that can be more sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogenous 
society, increased opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic processes, 
allowing for more innovation and experimentation in government, and making 
government more responsive by putting the states in competition for a mobile 
citizenry.61 
During the earliest days of America’s independence, individual states, not 
the federal government, largely controlled immigration matters.62 The norma-
tive shift to federal dominance over immigration-related matters began shortly 
                                                                                                                           
59 See infra notes 61–66 and accompanying text. 
60 See infra notes 67–77 and accompanying text. 
61 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457–59 (1991). 
62 See PRATHEEPAN GULASEKARAM & S. KARTHICK RAMAKRISHNAN, THE NEW IMMIGRATION 
FEDERALISM 14–17 (2015) (reviewing and explaining the lack of federal primacy in immigration law 
from 1776 through the end of the Civil War). One major reason that states dominated in immigration 
matters during this period was that the constitutional power to regulate immigration was an implied 
power, in contrast to the power to control naturalization that is expressly stated in the Constitution. 
Thus, expansion of federal power over immigration evolved as an exercise in judicial interpretation by 
the Supreme Court. Constitutional ambiguities also conveniently disguised a more practical reality 
underlying state-dominated power over immigration during this time: the federal government shied 
away from involving itself in immigration matters as southern lawmakers viewed federal government 
involvement in immigration regulation as a step toward regulation of the slave trade. Id. 
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after the end of the Civil War.63 Chy Lung v. Freeman, a 1875 Supreme Court 
case, was the first of a series of cases to begin this gradual shift,64 and subse-
quent cases began to delineate a bifurcation of power that left the federal gov-
ernment as the sole administrator of “immigration law” (that is, entry, exit, and 
enforcement) with state governments retaining power over laws that regulated 
the lives of immigrants (so-called “alienage laws”).65 Today, states continue to 
legislate in the immigration space, and courts continue to shape the contours of 
the line between alienage and enforcement law. But the federal government’s 
power to regulate immigration insofar as it relates to matters of the entry, exit, 
and immigration status is so absolute that it is termed a “plenary power.”66 
Within the traditional notion of federalism, scholars have treated the field 
of immigration as exceptional. Hiroshi Motomura first coined the phrase “im-
migration exceptionalism” to describe the dual pillars that allow scholars to 
treat and conceptualize immigration law differently than other substantive are-
as of the law.67 The first pillar refers to the core immigration functions of ad-
mission and removal that are exclusively federal in nature and implicate 
uniquely federal concerns.68 This first pillar is rooted in the commerce power 
rather than a more specific textual constitutional grant of power and will al-
ways preempt state efforts to legislate in the area (“structural preemption”).69 
The second pillar refers to the “plenary power doctrine,” which considers these 
                                                                                                                           
63 See id. 
64 92 U.S. 275, 279–80 (1875) (noting the importance of foreign nations to be able to confer with 
one national sovereign, rather than the fifty separate states, to discuss the status, safety, and security of 
their nationals in the United States). 
65 See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012) (striking down three of four provisions 
intended to allow local law enforcement in Arizona to supplement federal immigration enforcement 
efforts on preemption grounds); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 64 (1941) (“One of the most im-
portant and delicate of all international relationships . . . has to do with the protection of the just rights 
of a country’s own nationals when those nationals are in another country.”). But see De Canas v. Bica, 
424 U.S. 351, 358 (1976) (finding that Congress did not have clear intent to preclude harmonious state 
regulation regarding undocumented immigrants, reasoning that the state of California was not regulat-
ing in the space of making determinations on citizenship requirements, admission, or conditions under 
which an individual is allowed to stay). Congress subsequently enacted the Immigration Reform and 
Control Act ten years after De Canas v. Bica was decided, making it “unlawful for a person or other 
entity . . . to hire, or to recruit or refer for a fee, for employment in the United States an alien knowing 
the alien is an unauthorized alien.” 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1) (2018); see De Canas, 424 U.S. at 354–56. 
66 Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. at 387 (describing the “Federal Government’s broad, un-
doubted power over immigration and alien status”). 
67 Hiroshi Motomura, Federalism, International Human Rights, and Immigration Exceptionalism, 
70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1361, 1363–64 (1999). 
68 Id. at 1361–62 (noting federal exclusivity over “‘immigration law’ as traditionally defined—the 
law pertaining to the entry of noncitizens and their continued stay in the United States”). 
69 Although, as noted infra, some justify the exception treatment of immigration law on the basis 
that the Constitution grants the federal government the power “[t]o establish an uniform Rule of Natu-
ralization.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4; see infra note 71. 
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functions so important to national security, and to national control over foreign 
affairs issues, that when Congress acts, courts must exercise extraordinary def-
erence, even where fundamental constitutional rights are at stake.70 
Justifications for the exceptional treatment of immigration law abound. 
Most prominently, the textual constitutional argument that the federal govern-
ment has the power to “establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization.”71 Further, 
immigration policy implicates international relations and national security 
concerns, and impacts areas like tourism, trade, diplomatic relations, and 
treatment of American nationals abroad. A consistent national policy most 
readily ensures that these concerns are addressed in a singular voice.72 Yet, 
even in light of the justifications for the exceptional federal power over immi-
gration matters, this power is far from absolute. Constraints on federal power 
yield to possibilities for concurrent, cooperative state action in the immigration 
space. Still, defining the outer bounds of the federal immigration power has 
proven a challenging task.73 The contours of immigration federalism are sub-
ject to internal and external threat levels, global pressures, national security, 
political climate, and a myriad of other forces. A “one-size-fits-all” approach to 
every issue that touches—however minimally—on immigration hardly seems 
practical or prudent. In practice, no such approach can be derived from a re-
view of judicial decisions. 
                                                                                                                           
70 See Abrams, supra note 11, at 611–18 (outlining the history of the plenary power doctrine and 
immigration exceptionalism as it applies to the core functions of immigration enforcement); Motomu-
ra, supra note 67, at 1364 (noting “the plenary power doctrine, which severely limits judicial review 
when a government decision regarding a noncitizen’s entry or continued presence in the United States 
is challenged on constitutional grounds”). 
71 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4; see also Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. at 394–95 (“The Gov-
ernment of the United States has broad, undoubted power over the subject of immigration and the 
status of aliens . . . . This authority rests, in part, on the National Government’s constitutional power 
to ‘establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization[]’ . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
72 See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. at 394–95; David Weissbrodt & Laura Danielson, Chapter 
2: The Source and Scope of the Federal Power to Regulate Immigration and Naturalization, in DRAFT 
CHAPTERS OF THE IMMIGRATION NUTSHELL (2004), http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/immigrationlaw/
chapter2.html [https://perma.cc/EZQ3-T4WV] (providing a full historical accounting on the source 
and scope of the federal government’s power to regulate immigration). 
73 See Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration and Civil Rights: State and Local Efforts to Regulate Im-
migration, 46 GA. L. REV. 609, 614 n.14 (2017) (discussing the vigorous scholarly debate about “the 
appropriate role for state and local governments in immigration and immigrant regulation,” and identi-
fying two camps that have emerged: “[s]ome commentators see a more expansive role for the states 
than currently exists” and “[o]thers propose limited state and local government involvement in immi-
gration enforcement”); see also De Canas, 424 U.S. at 354–56 (discussing cases and noting that alt-
hough “[p]ower to regulate immigration is unquestionably exclusively a federal power . . . the Court 
has never held that every state enactment which in any way deals with aliens is a regulation of immi-
gration and thus per se pre-empted by this constitutional power, whether latent or exercised” (citations 
omitted)). 
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Generous deference to the federal government’s plenary power may oper-
ate well at the outskirts, but interior spaces can be quite suitable for concurrent 
state-directed initiatives on matters that relate to, but are more tangential to, 
removal or naturalization.74 Embedded in the principles of federalism is the 
notion that both national and state governments have elements of sovereignty 
that deserve mutual respect. The idea of having two sovereigns, however, cre-
ates ample opportunity for conflict. In the event of such conflict, the Suprema-
cy Clause provides a clear answer: federal law dominates over state law.75 In-
deed, flowing from the Supremacy Clause is the idea that, where there is con-
flict, federal law preempts state action. Whether there is conflict, however, is 
often a complicated question in itself. 
If Congress intends express preemption, it may withdraw specific powers 
of the States by enacting a statute that contains an express preemption provi-
sion (although in this process, Congress often leaves other powers untouched 
or explicitly leaves them to the States).76 Congress can also impliedly with-
draw specified powers from the states, as we discuss further infra.77 The SIJS 
statute does not contain an express preemption clause, nor would it make sense 
for Congress to designate state courts as a filter for a federal benefit but then 
entirely preclude them from fulfilling this role by preempting any state law 
that attempted to facilitate their involvement. Thus, the SIJS statute could only 
preempt state action under implied preemption principles. 
C. Implied Preemption and the Impact on SIJS 
This Section discusses types of preemption and their implications for the 
SIJS.78 The first type of implied preemption, field preemption, occurs when Con-
gress has legislated so extensively in a particular area that it has precluded en-
forcement of state laws on the same subject. The second type, conflict preemp-
tion, is when the essence of federal and state laws conflict such that compli-
ance with both would be impossible. Even when preemption is implied, its 
                                                                                                                           
74 See Chen, Elian or Alien?, supra note 15, at 602 (noting the federal government’s plenary 
power over immigration, but also discussing state and local government’s historical role in “protecting 
the health, safety, and welfare of children within their territories,” including undocumented minors). 
75 Federal law “shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be 
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” 
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
76 See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582, 600 (2011) (“[The Immigration 
Control and Reform Act] expressly preempts some state powers dealing with the employment of un-
authorized aliens and it expressly preserves others. We hold that Arizona’s licensing law falls well 
within the confines of the authority Congress chose to leave to the States and therefore is not express-
ly preempted.”). 
77 See infra note 79 and accompanying text. 
78 See infra notes 78–93 and accompanying text. 
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principles are grounded in an assumption that Congress tries to protect state 
sovereignty concerns. Particularly when states have traditionally occupied a 
certain function, implied preemption “start[s] with the assumption that the his-
toric police powers of the State[] were not to be superseded by [a] Federal Act 
unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”79 Further, a well-
established principle of preemption maintains that state laws are preempted 
when they “stand ‘as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the 
full purposes and objectives of Congress.’”80 Thus, preemption will be implied 
only where Congress is clear in its purpose and a state law frustrates that clear 
purpose. 
If Congress had intended field preemption within the SIJS statutory 
framework, no state action, including complementary or parallel action, would 
be allowed. The relevant inquiry would be whether federal statutory directives 
provide a full set of standards to govern the area of concern, which were “de-
signed as a ‘harmonious whole’”81 and which “reflect[] a congressional deci-
sion to foreclose any state regulation in the area.”82 Once again, given that 
Congress delegated the task of making best interest determinations to the 
states, it would be difficult to argue that Congress would have intended to ex-
clude states entirely from complementing federal SIJS law. The two-tiered sys-
tem certainly envisioned distinct state and federal roles in the process of gain-
ing SIJS, but Congress firmly embedded the states at the heart of this process 
by making them responsible for generating the factual determinations upon 
which grants of SIJS relief are based. Thus, we see no colorable argument in 
favor of field preemption. 
Conflict preemption, then, is the form of preemption that could most like-
ly be at play within the SIJS scheme. This could occur in one of two ways: (1) 
were it “impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal 
law,”83 or (2) were state laws to “stand[ ] as an obstacle to the accomplishment 
                                                                                                                           
79 Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009) (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 
485 (1996); see also Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 88 n.13 (2006) 
(“[W]e are concerned instead with Congress’ intent in adopting a pre-emption provision, the evident 
purpose of which is to limit the availability of remedies under state law.”); N.Y. State Dep’t of Soc. 
Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 413 (1973) (“If Congress is authorized to act in a field, it should 
manifest its intention clearly. It will not be presumed that a federal statute was intended to supersede 
the exercise of power of the state . . . .”) (quoting Schwartz v. Texas, 334 U.S. 119, 202–03 (1952)); 
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (“[W]e start with the assumption that the 
historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the 
clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”); Barber v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 383 F.3d 134, 136 
(3d Cir. 2004) (finding that the express text of ERISA preempts state law claims). 
80 See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. at 388 (quoting Hines, 312 U.S. at 67).  
81 Id. at 401 (quoting Hines, 312 U.S. at 72). 
82 Id. 
83 Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000). 
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and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress”—known, respec-
tively, as “impossibility preemption” and “obstacle preemption.”84 Preemption 
doctrine and analysis can appear confusing but, in application, it is more 
straightforward than it appears: most litigated cases are obstacle conflict 
preemption cases.85 A state law or regulations that stand as an impediment to 
the implementation of the SIJS statute and the provision of SIJS relief could 
theoretically be invalidated on obstacle conflict preemption grounds. 
Courts have not formally recognized a fourth type of preemption, termed 
“plenary power preemption.” Nevertheless, some immigration scholars have 
identified plenary power preemption as operating to invalidate state “alienage 
statutes” that touch on immigration issues but do not officially deal with the 
core immigration functions of admissions or removal consequences.86 As Ker-
ry Abrams notes, when plenary power preemption is invoked, Congress’s pow-
er to control immigration becomes pervasive, and “[Congress’s] power over 
immigration—exclusion and removal—and its ties with foreign affairs imbues 
everything that touches on immigration with an immigration-like quality.”87 
Most recently, the Supreme Court in Arizona v. United States addressed 
four provisions of a controversial Arizona statute called “Support Our Law 
Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act,” commonly referred to as S.B. 
1070: (1) section 3 created a state misdemeanor for failure to comply with fed-
eral alien-registration; (2) section 5 made it a misdemeanor for unauthorized 
individuals to seek or engage in work in the state; (3) section 6 gave law en-
forcement officers the authority to arrest a person if the officer had probable 
cause to believe the individual had committed a removable offense; and (4) 
section 2(b) required officers who conducted a stop, detention, or arrest to at-
tempt to verify a person’s immigration status with the federal government.88 
The United States filed suit against the State of Arizona to enjoin the enact-
ment of these provisions, and was successful in enjoining the enactment of 
three out of four of these provisions. Section 2(b) was the sole survivor after 
the application of preemption principles, and the Court warned that it too could 
                                                                                                                           
84 Id. at 372–73 (quoting Hines, 312 U.S. at 67). 
85 Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 226–29 (2000) (noting that conflict preemp-
tion “is ubiquitous” and that, although the impossibility preemption subset of conflict preemption 
cases is “vanishingly narrow,” obstacle preemption “potentially covers not only cases in which state 
and federal law contradict each other, but also all other cases in which courts think that the effects of 
state law will hinder accomplishment of the purposes behind federal law”); see also Abrams, supra 
note 11, at 608–09 (discussing the reasons that most preemption cases are obstacle conflict in nature, 
concluding that, “in most cases, both the federal and state governments have a legitimate claim that 
they have the power to legislate in the area, and the court must ascertain whether the state’s legislation 
gets in the way of federal legislation to such an extent that it frustrates the federal purpose”). 
86 Abrams, supra note 11 passim. 
87 Id. at 623. 
88 Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. at 393–94. 
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be preempted—or struck down on other constitutional challenges—to the ex-
tent Arizona enforced it in a way that created conflict between state and federal 
regulations.89 
At first glance, the decision in Arizona seems to support the notion of 
federal primacy in immigration matters. After all, the Court struck down three 
of the four provisions, and upheld the fourth only to the extent that it did not 
result in Fourth Amendment violations or use racial profiling to accomplish its 
objectives, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Indeed, the decision 
appears to offer no break from prior law, buttressing the primacy of the federal 
government’s role in immigration policy and enforcement.90 But against a 
backdrop where states have become increasingly proactive in regulating the 
immigration space over the past twenty years (in some cases, becoming the 
primary point of contact for noncitizens who face removal), Arizona creates 
some confusion. This is particularly true at a time when local law enforcement 
has become more empowered in exercising its “inherent authority” to perform 
immigration status checks during other law enforcement efforts and through 
the enforcement of state and local criminal law provisions aimed at migrants.91 
Under the Trump administration, executive management of local and state 
law enforcement in immigration enforcement has been actively encouraged 
and become an even more widespread practice. The Secure Communities pro-
gram—under which the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) shares finger-
prints, received from local law enforcement to check for a criminal record and 
outstanding warrants, with the DHS to check against immigration databases—
                                                                                                                           
89 Id. at 415–16. 
90 Jennifer M. Chacón, The Transformation of Immigration Federalism, 21 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 577, 597–606 (2012) (discussing the shift toward immigration enforcement at the state and 
local level because of the federal government’s increasing reliance on local enforcement agencies and 
tracing this shift mostly to changes in executive policy that led to fundamental change in the culture of 
some state and local law enforcement agencies, some of which now “view immigration enforcement 
as a core function”). 
91 See Jennifer M. Chacón, A Diversion of Attention? Immigration Courts and the Adjudication of 
Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 DUKE L.J. 1563, 1581 (2010) (summarizing the changes in 
executive policy after September 11, 2001, that started a trend toward increasing local and state en-
forcement of immigration laws). But see GULASEKARAM & RAMAKRISHNAN, supra note 62, at 123–
25 (noting the sudden shift in immigration policy landscape starting in 2012 as result of Arizona, such 
as the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program under the Obama administration, 
which allowed unauthorized immigrant youth to apply for a period of deferred prosecution from fed-
eral authorities). Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan note that the state legislative momentum shifted 
away from restrictive policy and toward legislation that favored integration of immigrants. GU-
LASEKARAM & RAMAKRISHNAN, supra note 62, at 125 (“Thus, the announcement and rollout of 
DACA in 2012, combined with the Supreme Court decision in Arizona, tipped the political scales 
away from restrictionist solutions to immigration policy and toward immigrant integration.”). 
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has expanded in scope.92 Moreover, the federal government has prioritized in-
creasing local participation in the 287(g) program, under which the Director of 
ICE can enter into agreements with state and local law enforcement agencies 
that permit designated officers to perform limited immigration law enforce-
ment function.93 Thus, the contours of plenary power preemption in the immi-
gration context are unclear and in flux. 
In the context of SIJS, state and local government has encroached upon the 
federal government’s authority in immigration matters and this encroachment 
has had both pro- and anti-immigrant effects. Currently, state courts have taken 
two general approaches: either (1) to expand access to SIJS, with states crafting 
legislation to explicitly create jurisdiction for SIJS actions and/or extended juris-
diction for SIJS applicants up to twenty-one years of age, consistent with federal 
age limits, or (2) to restrict access to SIJS, with state court judges refusing to 
entertain SIJS factual findings under the ostensible excuse that Congress has no 
power to exert control over state courts or to confer jurisdiction on those courts. 
We discuss the bases and consequences of these different approaches below. 
II. SIJS-FRIENDLY STATES AND THE RECENT  
(IMPERMISSIBLE) USCIS RESPONSE 
In this Part, we examine various state legislative and judicial efforts to 
support Congress’s intent to ensure and expand access to SIJS protection.94 
Section A of this Part describes states whose legal frameworks facilitate chil-
dren’s access to SIJS relief.95 Section B highlights helpful actions that state 
courts have taken to increase SIJS access.96 Section C follows this with a dis-
                                                                                                                           
92 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,799 (Jan. 25, 2017) (pertaining to “[e]nhan-
cing [p]ublic [s]afety” within the United States). This executive order directed the Secretary of Home-
land Security to immediately terminate the “Priority Enforcement Program,” adopted by the Obama 
Administration, which had limited the scope of the Secure Communities Program in response to criti-
cisms that the program shared information between local and federal law enforcement agencies, thus 
placing noncitizens with relatively minor criminal charges (rather than convictions) into the queue for 
removal. Id. at 8,801. The executive order sought to embrace the full breath of the Secure Communi-
ties program to permit crime-based removals to cover all aliens arrested for any crime. Id. 
93 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,793 (Jan. 25, 2017) (expressing the policy to 
“cooperate fully with States and local law enforcement in enacting Federal-State partnerships to enforce 
Federal immigration priorities” and directing the Secretary of Homeland Security to “immediately take 
appropriate action to engage with the Governors of the States, as well as local officials, for the purpose of 
preparing to enter into agreements under [§] 287(g) of the INA (8 U.S.C. [§] 1357(g))”). Id. at 8,794–
8795. The Trump Administration has also sought to revive cooperative section 287(g) agreements that 
had fallen into disfavor by the Obama Administration because of concerns for racial profiling and the 
negative impact on civil rights. See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2018). 
94 See infra notes 99–155 and accompanying text. 
95 See infra notes 99–114 and accompanying text. 
96 See infra notes 115–121 and accompanying text. 
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cussion of recent USCIS policy changes under the Trump administration, how 
these policy changes have been addressed by courts, and why these changes 
have impermissibly surpassed the congressional grant of authority to USCIS 
under the SIJS statute.97 Lastly, Section D utilizes two state court cases to illus-
trate how these laws and policies operate in practice.98 
A. States and Cities with “SIJS-Friendly” Policies and Laws 
This Section elaborates on state laws and policies, as well as city legisla-
tion, that help children obtain SIJS protection.99 A juvenile’s ability to access a 
state court and obtain a predicate SIJS order varies greatly according to that 
state’s child welfare policy and practice, family law, and access to specialized 
representation.100 Laila Hlass has analyzed SIJS application rates and found 
that states with high application rates, including California, New York, Massa-
chusetts, and Texas, have immigration resources in place to assist potential 
SIJS applicants.101 These states have some combination of the following: spe-
cialized SIJS forms, more nonprofit attorneys practicing youth immigration 
law, and/or regular trainings for child welfare workers on SIJS practice.102 
They also tend to have a history of immigration liaisons, child welfare policies 
to address immigration needs, and sophisticated screening.103 
For example, California, a state with a child welfare system that its coun-
ties administer, passed legislation in 2014 to harmonize the care counties pro-
vide to SIJS applicants and require the Department of Child Services to identi-
fy and share best practices annually to help children applying for SIJS assis-
tance in juvenile court.104 New York state competes with California in its high 
numbers of SIJS applicants.105 New York City has developed programs and 
legislation to assist children who may potentially be eligible for SIJS. For ex-
ample, Local Law 6 was drafted with an intent that the Administration for 
Children Services (ACS) would “ensure that immigration relief is a factor in 
                                                                                                                           
97 See infra notes 122–132 and accompanying text. 
98 See infra notes 133–155 and accompanying text. 
99 See infra notes 100–114 and accompanying text. 
100 See Hlass, supra note 40, at 301. 
101 Id. at 304–15 (examining the resources and practices of the “[h]igher-[a]pplication [r]ate 
[j]urisdictions” of California, New York, Massachusetts, and Texas). 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 304. 
104 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 10609.97 (West 2019); see Hlass, supra note 40, at 304–07 (de-
scribing California’s child welfare system and treatment of SIJS applications). 
105 See Hlass, supra note 40, at 308. Hlass notes that New York surpassed California for SIJS ap-
plicants for the first time in 2012 after New York City created legislation to address the needs of SIJS 
applicants. Id. 
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permanency planning for non-citizen youth[s].”106 ACS, as a result, has been 
tasked with designating someone to create and implement a plan for available 
forms of relief, tracking children, providing children with immigration-related 
services, and training workers on relevant immigration-related issues.107 
Florida and Massachusetts have also developed policies in response to the 
influx of SIJS applicants. Florida passed legislation requiring its Department 
of Children and Families and community-based care providers to “petition the 
court for an order finding that the child meets the criteria for [SIJ] status” if 
that child might be eligible.108 In Massachusetts, the Department of Children 
and Families (Massachusetts DCF) has a longstanding history of helping im-
migrant children and referring them for appropriate immigration-related re-
lief.109 Massachusetts DCF not only has an immigration unit, but it also con-
tracts with a private law firm that specializes in immigration-related issues.110 
The firm assists the department in liaising with caseworkers to assess the 
forms of immigration relief available to each child and to identify and direct an 
appropriate course of action.111 Further, Massachusetts DCF policy and guidance 
is explicit and extensive, and dictates multiple points in the child’s life where 
immigration status and possible forms of relief should be considered.112 In addi-
tion, Massachusetts judges are required to attend trainings on SIJS topics.113 
In contrast to states like Massachusetts, California, New York, and Flori-
da, states with low SIJS application rates typically have little support in place 
for minors who could potentially qualify for this form of relief.114 Thus, SIJS 
relief goes largely unclaimed when a state does little to develop the infrastruc-
ture needed for children to take advantage of it. It is little surprise, then, that 
the states that have responded to the influx of unaccompanied minors with pol-
icies and education connecting youth to SIJS-related resources have more ex-
                                                                                                                           
106 N.Y.C., N.Y., A Local Law to Amend the Administrative Code of the City of New York, in 
Relation to Requiring the Administration for Children’s Services to Review Strategies and Create a 
Plan of Action to Protect Children Who Qualify for Special Immigrant Juvenile Status, 2010/006 § 1 
(April 14, 2010). 
107 N.Y.C., N.Y., CITY ADMIN. CODE § 21-904(a) (2020) (containing a sunset provision for 
2015). 
108 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.5075(4) (West 2019). Florida’s statute provides: “If the child may be 
eligible for special immigrant juvenile status, the department or community-based care provider shall 
petition the court for an order finding that the child meets the criteria for special immigrant juvenile 
status.” Id. 
109 See Unaccompanied Refugee Minors Program, MASS. EXEC. OFFICE OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., https://www.mass.gov/service-details/unaccompanied-refugee-minors-program [https://perma.
cc/TR72-S2FP] (discussing Massachusetts DCF’s program for assisting immigrant children). 
110 See Hlass, supra note 40, at 310–11. 
111 See id. 
112 Id. at 311. 
113 Id. 
114 See id. at 315–18. 
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perience with SIJS applicants, a better understanding of the harms Congress 
was attempting to address when it created and later expanded access to relief, 
and more helpful caselaw in the area of SIJS to further shape the legal land-
scape in ways that benefit these children. 
B. Supportive Efforts by State Judiciaries 
This Section discusses actions by state courts to help children access SIJS 
relief.115 Concurrent with legislation and policy efforts, many state courts have 
now had the opportunity to address whether the SIJS statute requires courts to 
make factual findings to be included in a predicate order for SIJS relief. In 
some states, recent state caselaw has offered broader protection to children seek-
ing SIJS relief, noting that Congress, through the SIJS statutory framework, cre-
ated an affirmative duty for state courts to make SIJS factual findings.116 
Not surprisingly, California and New York have emerged as leaders in in-
terpreting the SIJS statutory scheme in this way. For example, in California, 
where a juvenile court refused to make factual findings in support of an appli-
cation for SIJS for Y.M., a minor with significant intellectual impairments who 
was subject to a deportation hearing, the state Court of Appeals held: 
Under federal law, an unaccompanied minor has the right to petition 
the juvenile court for findings under the SIJ statute. Because Y.M. 
was potentially eligible for SIJ status, she was entitled to a hearing 
where the juvenile court would determine whether findings required 
for SIJ status existed. We find nothing in federal immigration law 
that permits a state juvenile court to determine which route, if any, 
an unaccompanied child or minor may explore to lawfully remain in 
the United States. Although the federal government will ultimately 
determine Y.M.’s immigration status, including her right to perma-
nent residency, the juvenile court erred in declining to consider 
Y.M.’s request for SIJ findings.117 
Thus, California interprets the SIJS statute as requiring state courts of 
competent jurisdiction to make SIJS-related findings. California is not alone in 
its interpretation of the statute. Georgia affirmed this approach, stating that, 
“[a]lthough the court was authorized to conclude that the petitioners failed to 
                                                                                                                           
115 See infra notes 116–121 and accompanying text. 
116 If states have been left out of this Section, it is unintentional. Nonetheless, it does not affect 
the general point of this Section, which is to show that a majority of states that have taken on this 
question have resolved the issue in favor of providing broader access to SIJS protection for vulnerable 
children. 
117 In re Y.M., 144 Cal. Rptr. 3d 54, 72–73 (Ct. App. 2012) (citations omitted). 
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present evidence to support the SIJ factors or that their evidence was not credi-
ble, the court had a duty to consider the SIJ factors and make findings.”118 
Courts in Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New York, New Jersey, and 
Tennessee have also supported this interpretation of the statute.119 
Integrationist policies, like those that expand access to SIJS, are often not 
challenged in federal court as it can be difficult to show that a litigant opposing 
the ordinance has legal redress or injury to maintain standing.120 In lieu of 
making a federal court challenge, USCIS has deployed another tactic in an ef-
fort to restrict access to SIJS applicants. Where states have attempted to align 
with Congress’s intent and plain language of the SIJS statute, USCIS has be-
gun questioning the underlying predicate orders upon which SIJS would be 
granted. The agency’s new policies, which appear to allow USCIS to look be-
hind state predicate orders to question state law and jurisdiction, have created a 
recent increase in SIJS application denials.121 
                                                                                                                           
118 In re J.J.X.C., 734 S.E.2d 120, 124 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012). 
119 See, e.g., In re Dany G., 117 A.3d 650, 655 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2015) (“If the underlying ju-
venile court filing is properly before the court, state courts are required to make [SIJS] factual find-
ings.”); Simbaina v. Bunay, 109 A.3d 191, 198–201 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2015) (finding that a court is 
obliged to make SIJS findings of fact, even in the absence of a separate motion requesting SIJS find-
ings, as long as the matter is properly before the court and the moving party has requested SIJS find-
ings as a form of relief); In re Guardianship of Penate, 76 N.E.3d 960, 965–67 (Mass. 2017) (noting 
that Congress delegated the task of making special findings of fact related to SIJS to the states, and the 
judge is obliged to make these findings even if she suspects that the immigrant child’s motivation is 
something other than relief from abuse, neglect, or abandonment); In re Guardianship of Guaman, 879 
N.W.2d 668, 673 (Minn. Ct. App. 2016) (“The SIJ statute ‘employs a unique hybrid procedure that 
directs the collaboration of state and federal systems.’ This collaborative procedure is impaired when 
state courts fail to consider a request for SIJ findings. Here . . . the probate court abused its discretion 
by declining to consider appellant’s request for SIJ findings.” (quoting In re Hei Ting C., 969 
N.Y.S.2d 150, 152 (2013))); H.S.P. v. J.K., 121 A.3d 849, 852 (N.J. 2015) (“Family Part courts faced 
with a request for an SIJ predicate order should make factual findings with regard to each of the re-
quirements . . . .”); In re Mohamed B., 921 N.Y.S.2d 145, 147 (App. Div. 2011) (“The Family Court 
improperly denied Mohamed’s motion for the issuance of an order declaring that he is dependent on 
the Family Court and making specific findings that would allow him to apply to the USCIS for special 
immigrant juvenile status—a gateway to lawful permanent residency in the United States.”); In re 
Domingo C.L., No. M2016-02383-COA-R3-JV, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 590, at *19–20 (Ct. App. 
Aug. 30, 2017) (holding that lower court had jurisdiction to make finding of whether it was in best 
interest of minor child to be returned to child’s home country of Guatemala, remanding case, and 
directing lower court to make requested finding). 
120 See GULASEKARAM & RAMAKRISHNAN, supra note 62, at 181. 
121 U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., NUMBER OF I-360 PETITIONS FOR SPECIAL IMMI-
GRANT WITH A CLASSIFICATION OF SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE (SIJ) BY FISCAL YEAR, QUARTER 
AND CASE STATUS FISCAL YEAR 2019 (2019), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/
data/I360_sij_performancedata_fy2019_qtr2.pdf [https://perma.cc/8F97-29VP] [hereinafter NUMBER 
OF I-360 PETITIONS TABLE, 2010–2019]. 
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C. Recent Federal Policy Changes to SIJS Application Review  
Procedure Created Impermissible Restraints on State Action 
This Section focuses on adjustments to federal policy that changed the 
procedure for SIJS application review.122 The SIJS statutory scheme is inher-
ently complicated and unique, given Congress’s choice to insert state actors 
into what is traditionally a federally dominated immigration system. But this 
insertion was, in fact, very deliberate, and Congress’s reliance upon state juve-
nile courts in the SIJS statutory scheme demonstrates a clear indication that 
states should retain primary responsibility and administrative proficiency in 
safeguarding child welfare.123 In contrast to other forms of immigration relief, 
such as petitions for asylum or petitions for relief under the Violence Against 
Women Act (VAWA), where Congress retained USCIS as the sole adjudicator 
of these claims for relief, the SIJ statute limits the role of USCIS to the verifi-
cation of only certain information.124 Further, although the Secretary of Home-
land Security must “consent[ ] to the grant of special immigrant juvenile sta-
tus,” the statute specifically provides that the USCIS must rely upon juvenile 
court findings of the history of “abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar ba-
sis found under State law.”125 Thus the statute explicitly preconditions receipt 
of a substantive immigration benefit upon a state court order. In fact, Congress 
envisioned a system that would preclude USCIS from revisiting or re-
adjudicating the matter at all.126 Since the creation of the SIJS statute, USCIS 
                                                                                                                           
122 See infra notes 123–132 and accompanying text.  
123 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i) (2018) (requiring a predicate order from a “juvenile court lo-
cated in the United States”); Chen, Elian or Alien?, supra note 15, at 609. 
124 Chen, Elian or Alien?, supra note 15, at 607–09 (contrasting VAWA and asylum legislative 
schemes with the SIJS statute and concluding that “the SIJ statute does not authorize federal agency 
review of the state court determinations,” but rather, “the state court’s order is the substantive re-
quirement for the immigration benefit” (emphasis added and omitted)); see also Zhen-Hua Gao v. 
Jenifer, 185 F.3d 548, 555 (6th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he INA specifically delegates determinations of de-
pendency, eligibility for long-term foster care, and the best interest of the child to state juvenile 
courts.”). 
125 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) (requiring a predicate order from a “juvenile court located in the 
United States”); see also Special Immigrant Status; Certain Aliens Declared Dependent on a Juvenile 
Court; Revocation of Approval of Petitions; Bona Fide Marriage Exemption to Marriage Fraud 
Amendments; Adjustment of Status, 58 Fed. Reg. 42,843, 42,847 (Aug. 12, 1993) (“The final [regula-
tions] state[] that the decision concerning the best interest of the child may only be made by the juve-
nile court or in administrative proceedings authorized or recognized by the juvenile court.” (emphasis 
added)). 
126 USCIS policy, regulations, and administrative judges have supported this interpretation of 
congressional intent. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c)(1) (2020) (presuming the jurisdiction of state juvenile 
courts to issue dependency orders for individuals over the age of eighteen); Yates Memo, supra note 
50, at 4–5; see also In re Self-Petitioner, 2015 WL 3545456, at *3 (Dep’t of Homeland Sec., AAO 
May 7, 2015) (finding that the SIJS provision does not permit USCIS to go “behind the [juvenile] 
court’s order to make [its] own determination under state child welfare law” in a decision by USCIS’s 
own administrative judges). 
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has continued to reaffirm its policy of giving broad deference to state court 
determinations in their own jurisdiction and power to issue the findings con-
tained within juvenile court orders.127 
A recent dramatic increase in the number of SIJS denials followed a 
change in USCIS policy.128 Following this change in policy, USCIS began to 
question state court jurisdiction over SIJS applicants.129 The change in policy 
also resulted in challenges to the underlying factual findings within state predi-
cate orders,130 disregarding congressional statutory language to the contrary.131 
Changes in late 2019 threaten to erode a SIJS applicant’s chances even more.132 
Recent cases in California and New York successfully challenged USCIS’s 
authority under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to re-adjudicate SIJS 
petitions and to question a state court’s interpretation of its own state law or 
jurisdictional requirements. 
D. J.L. v. Cissna (CA) and R.F.M. v. Nielsen (NY) 
This Section analyzes two cases that disputed USCIS’s authority to 
change decisions on SIJS petitions and second-guess the findings of state 
                                                                                                                           
127 58 Fed. Reg. at 42,848; Interoffice Memorandum from Michael Aytes, Acting Assoc. Dir., 
U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., AFM Update: Chapter 22: Employment-Based Petitions 
(AD03-01) 82 (Sept. 12, 2006) https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/memos/afm_ch22_
091206r.pdf [https://perma.cc/RXY4-RNQJ]. 
128 USCIS data shows that there has been a significant increase in denials of SIJS applications 
since 2010 when the agency started recording this data. For example, in 2010, the rate of application 
denials was 6.5%. Most recently in 2019, following the change in policy in 2018, the rate has almost 
doubled since then and now is at its peak, at 12.28%. See NUMBER OF I-360 PETITIONS TABLE, 2010–
2019, supra note 120. 
129 See supra note 19. 
130 See, e.g., W.A.O. v. Cuccinelli, No. 2:19-cv-11696 (MCA) (MAH), 2019 WL 3549898, at *3 
(D.N.J. July 3, 2019) (“Based on the New Jersey law[,] . . . USCIS shall not, until further Order of this 
Court, delay, deny, or revoke SIJS petitions on the ground that the [Court] lacks jurisdiction to make 
SIJ Findings as to juveniles who are between 18 and 21 years old, so long as New Jersey law estab-
lishes that the juvenile is subject to such jurisdiction.”). 
131 See R.F.M. v. Nielsen, 365 F. Supp. 3d 350, 360 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (“[F]ollowing a policy . . . 
[t]hat effectively precludes those immigrants in New York State from obtaining SIJ status despite the 
fact that the immigration statute otherwise provides that relief . . . [is a] change [that] must come from 
Congress and not from the immigration authorities.”); J.L. v. Cissna, 341 F. Supp. 3d 1048, 1062 
(N.D. Cal. 2018) (finding that a USCIS policy that questions state interpretation of its own law is 
“inconsistent with the plain text of the SIJ statute”); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J); W.A.O., 2019 
WL 3549898, at *1 (“Congress reserved a critical role for state courts in the SIJS framework because 
state courts are expert in making child welfare determinations, including with what individual or 
agency a juvenile should be placed; whether the juvenile has been abused, neglected, or abandoned; 
and what is in his or her best interest.”). 
132 See generally USCIS POLICY MANUAL, supra note 19, at chs. 2(C), 3 (limiting the types of 
juvenile state courts capable of generating predicate orders and requiring applicants to have petitioned 
and received specific forms of relief (i.e., decisions on custody and child welfare provisions) in order 
for USCIS to consent to grant of SIJS, among other changes). 
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courts.133 The plaintiffs in J.L. v. Cissna, a 2018 case brought in the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of California, were four young 
immigrants who sought to represent a class of children who (1) were subject to 
guardianship orders under California state law, and (2) either had or could have 
their SIJS petitions denied because the state court could not reunify the chil-
dren with their parents.134 The petitioners requested injunctive relief, arguing 
that they were denied SIJS status based on a new policy USCIS promulgated 
that imposed requirements beyond the scope of the law and that, in turn, vio-
lated the APA.135 
In 2014, the California legislature added a provision to the California 
Code of Civil Procedure granting jurisdiction to the state Superior Court to 
make factual findings required for a SIJS petition.136 Specifically the legisla-
ture empowered California probate courts to appoint a guardian for a juvenile 
between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one to make the factual findings re-
quired for an SIJS petition,137 explicitly giving them governing power under 
the same substantive law as guardianship of minors.138 
In Cissna, the plaintiffs contended that, in the summer of 2017, USCIS 
began holding SIJS applications for individuals between the ages of eighteen 
and twenty for longer than 180 days to implement a new policy regarding 
SIJS.139 USCIS initially denied any change of policy, but then did an about-
face and publicly acknowledged that a change in policy had, in fact, oc-
curred.140 In February 2018, the USCIS Office of the Chief Counsel (OCC) 
released its guidance that “[t]he evidence submitted must establish that the 
court had the power and authority to make the required determinations about 
the care and custody of the petitioner, which includes parental reunification, as 
                                                                                                                           
133 See infra notes 134–155 and accompanying text. 
134 Cissna, 341 F. Supp. 3d at 1056. 
135 Id. at 1054. 
136 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 155(a)(1) (Deering 2019). 
137 CAL. PROB. CODE § 1510.1 (West 2019). 
138 CAL. PROB. CODE § 1514 (West 2019) (citing CAL. FAM. CODE Div. 8, Pt. 2, chs. 1, 2). 
139 Cissna, 341 F. Supp. 3d at 1056–57. 
140 On April 18, 2018, in a statement to the New York Times, USCIS denied that there had been 
any change in policy with regard to SIJS applications. See Robbins, supra note 19 (“U.S.C.I.S. has not 
issued any new guidance or policy directives regarding the adjudication of S.I.J. petitions.” (quoting 
USCIS spokesman)). One week later, however, USCIS publicly conceded that it had recently started 
to deny SIJS applications based on new guidance issued in February 2018. See Hesson, supra note 19 
(noting that USCIS clarified that its chief counsel’s office issued guidance in February 2018 for the 
agency to reject pending applications in cases where applicants could not be returned to the custody of 
a parent). According to Politico, “The logic [of the new guidance] is that if a state court can’t legally 
place a young person in the custody of a parent or guardian (for instance, in cases where the young 
person is over 18), the applicant shouldn’t be eligible for an SIJ visa. The guidance effectively means 
young people over age 18 can be denied visas, even though the program remains open to people under 
age 21.” Id. 
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a juvenile.”141 According to the Cissna court, the USCIS, after making the 
statement that “most courts . . . do not have power and authority to make the 
reunification finding for purposes of SIJ eligibility,” went on to revise its poli-
cy position to reflect OCC’s legal guidance.142 
The court in Cissna granted the plaintiffs a preliminary injunction based 
on the arbitrary and capricious nature of USCIS’s policy change and failure to 
provide adequate notice of the change in violation of the APA.143 The court 
also offered a view of the SIJS statute consistent with our understanding of it 
as a model of cooperative federalism, with discernable and more predictable 
boundaries. In this way, the states and the federal government can work to-
gether in the interior spaces of the United States where threats to national secu-
rity may be less acute. The court noted that: 
USCIS guidance states that “[g]enerally, a petition should not be de-
nied based USCIS’ [sic] interpretation of state law, but rather offic-
ers should defer to the juvenile court’s interpretation of the relevant 
state laws.” The evidence accompanying a SIJ petition only needs to 
“establish that the juvenile court based its decision, including 
whether or not it has jurisdiction to issue the order, on state law ra-
ther than federal immigration law.” The California Supreme Court 
has found that California probate courts have jurisdiction to make 
“necessary state court findings,” including reunification determina-
tions. Under USCIS’s own guidance, this should settle the issue.144 
In other words, Congress created a system that delineated specific roles 
for federal and state powers: state courts make underlying factual determina-
tions regarding a child’s best interest, and USCIS decides whether each of 
these factual determinations has been met without questioning the underlying 
                                                                                                                           
141 Cissna, 341 F. Supp. 3d at 1057 (quoting U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Office of the 
Chief Counsel, Legal Guidance Clarifying OCC Interpretation of Reunification with One or Both 
Parents for Purposes of Establishing Eligibility for SIJ Classification (Feb. 2018), at 1 (on file with 
author)). 
142 Id. at 1057 (quoting statement from USCIS spokesperson Jonathan Withington to Politico) 
(“USCIS then revised its Consolidated Handbook of Adjudication Procedures, a companion resource 
to its Policy Manual, to reflect OCC guidance.”) The USCIS Policy Manual appears to be replacing 
the Consolidated Handbook of Adjudication Procedures (CHAP) and other policy and guidance repos-
itories. The American Immigration Lawyers Association reports that “[t]he USCIS Policy Manual is 
the agency’s centralized online repository for USCIS’s immigration policies. The USCIS Policy Man-
ual will ultimately replace the Adjudicator’s Field Manual (AFM), the USCIS Immigration Policy 
Memoranda site, and other policy repositories.” Tracking USCIS Policy Manual Changes, AM. IM-
MIGR. LAWS. ASS’N, https://www.aila.org/infonet/tracking-uscis-policy-manual-changes [https://per
ma.cc/5K5G-WD42]. 
143 Cissna, 341 F. Supp. 3d at 1058–66. 
144 Id. at 1061–62 (internal citations omitted). 
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application of state law. In Cissna, the court found a USCIS policy that ques-
tioned a state’s ability to apply its own law to be “inconsistent with the plain 
text of the SIJ statute.”145 Presumably, and within congressional limits, the 
state is then left to expand or constrict SIJS protections for juvenile applicants 
living within its borders. Of course, a state could not expand SIJS protections 
beyond what the statute specified. As an obvious example, if a state expanded 
its definition of “child” to include people over the age of twenty-one, it would 
conflict with the SIJS statute because the statute’s upper age boundary defines 
a child as twenty-one years of age or younger.146 But aligning state law with 
federal law to maximize protection for the very group of immigrants Congress 
intended to protect would be an example of a permissible way states could 
complement the statutory scheme. 
In R.F.M. v. Neilsen, a 2019 case that closely paralleled Cissna legally and 
factually, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New 
York granted summary judgment to a group of young immigrant plaintiffs who 
contended that USCIS’s new policy violated the APA.147 The plaintiffs in 
R.F.M. were young immigrants whom the New York State Family Court had 
determined were abused, abandoned, or neglected, and who had sought and 
failed to receive SIJS.148 The court made it very clear that immigration authori-
ties were not authorized to make changes to the SIJS statute in a way that pre-
cluded SIJS relief that New York state had otherwise allowed for, stating: 
It is plain that the defendants, contrary to their prior practice, and in 
contravention of federal law, are now following a policy whereby the 
New York Family Court cannot issue the necessary findings to juve-
nile immigrants between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one to ena-
ble them to obtain SIJ status. That effectively precludes those immi-
grants in New York State from obtaining SIJ status despite the fact 
that the immigration statute otherwise provides that relief. If the im-
migration laws are to be changed in that way, the change must come 
from Congress and not from the immigration authorities. Therefore, 
the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment should be granted 
. . . .149 
Most of the opinion relates to the plaintiffs’ arguments that the USCIS’s 
new policy violated the APA. The court disposed of the policy by finding that 
                                                                                                                           
145 Id. at 1062. As we discuss infra in Part III of this Article, a federal statute designed to question 
a state court’s ability to apply its own law would raise distinct constitutional issues as well. 
146 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J); 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(c)(1). 
147 365 F. Supp. 3d at 383. 
148 Id. at 359. 
149 Id. at 360. 
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it contravened the plain meaning of the SIJS statute. Therefore, the court un-
dertook no constitutional analysis on the appropriateness of a federal agency 
questioning the application of state law or state jurisdiction. Nonetheless, in 
the context of addressing the argument that USCIS acted beyond the scope of 
its consent authority, the court made explicit that the plain language of the SIJS 
statute, as Congress drafted it, does not give USCIS the authority to question 
the application of New York state law, stating: 
The USCIS Policy Manual explains that the agency relies on the state 
court’s expertise in these matters, and the agency is not to reweigh the 
evidence on which the state court relied in issuing a Special Findings 
Order . . . . By arguing that the New York Family Court lacks jurisdic-
tion to make the requisite SIJ findings, the agency is substituting its 
interpretation of New York law for that of the New York Family 
Court. The defendants have not cited any authority to support such a 
broad use of the consent function. Indeed, such a broad use of the 
consent function contravenes the directives in the agency’s Consoli-
dated Handbook of Adjudication Procedures . . . .150 
The initial outcomes in Cissna and R.F.M. provided a positive signal from 
the courts: states are free to operate in concert with the federal government in 
the immigration space, provided Congress has carefully delineated the bounda-
ries of their involvement. Both New York and California created statutory 
frameworks that went no further than the boundaries defined under the SIJS 
statute: where a gap existed between state and federal law, New York and Cali-
fornia filled the gap to extend coverage for children between the ages of eight-
een and twenty-one who were otherwise eligible for SIJS relief.151 
Ultimately, the USCIS reached a court-approved settlement in Cissna, in 
which the parties agreed that: 
1. USCIS will no longer require state courts to have the authority to 
place into custody or order reunification of a SIJ applicant with 
his or her parents in order to determine whether the reunification 
with one or both of their parents is not viable for the purposes of 
SIJ eligibility; 
2. Pursuant to Cal. Prob. Code § 1510.1 and Cal. Code Civ. Proc. 
§ 155, the Probate Division of the California Superior Court is a 
“juvenile court” for the purpose of making findings and issuing 
orders for SIJ purposes; 
                                                                                                                           
150 Id. at 380–81. 
151 CAL. PROB. CODE § 1510.1; N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 661 (McKinney 2011). 
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3. An individual is not disqualified from SIJ status if (a) state law 
confers upon a state court the jurisdiction to declare her depend-
ent, legally commit her to an individual or entity, or place her un-
der the custody of another individual or entity regardless of her 
age; and (b) she is unmarried and under the age of 21 when she 
petitions for SIJ status; 
4. A “child” as defined by Cal. Prob. Code § 1510.1 is not disquali-
fied from SIJ status, despite having reached California’s age of 
majority before obtaining a custodial placement or legal commit-
ment as required for SIJ eligibility because California Probate 
Courts have jurisdiction over such “child” as a “juvenile” for pur-
poses of SIJ status under § 1510.1.152 
Thus, the plaintiffs received all of the relief that they sought. Although 
much of the focus in Cissna and R.F.M. was on whether USCIS’s change in 
policy violated the APA, both courts upheld their respective states’ legislative 
efforts that were intended to operate in tandem with federal law to fill the gaps 
serving to block access to SIJS relief, and rejected USCIS’s attempt to restrict 
SIJS relief contrary to the plain language of the SIJS statute.153 
The outcomes in Cissna and R.F.M. may have temporarily halted the appli-
cation of the Trump administration’s policy allowing re-adjudication of state 
child welfare laws or jurisdiction in California and New York (and with some 
broader geographic applications). Yet the intent of the administration is clear and 
the geographically broader settlement in Cissna was only effective to benefit 
those who filed for SIJS prior to December 15, 2019.154 As a result, we can ex-
pect to see additional changes to USCIS policy that seek to undercut state legis-
lative efforts to broaden access to SIJS relief to the fullest extent permissible 
under the SIJS statute. Elsewhere, children hoping to apply for SIJS relief con-
tinue to face state-imposed barriers that preclude access to relief by maintaining 
that it is unconstitutional for Congress to compel states to make SIJS findings.155 
                                                                                                                           
152 J.L. v. Cuccinelli, No. 18-cv-04914-NC, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 218536, at *5–6 (N.D. Cal. 
Dec. 18, 2019) (quoting the parties’ settlement agreement). 
153 R.F.M., 365 F. Supp. 3d at 378; Cissna, 341 F. Supp. 3d at 1059. 
154 Robbins, supra note 19; see also Ingrid V. Eagly, The Movement to Decriminalize Border 
Crossing, 61 B.C. L. REV. 1967, 1977 (2020) (discussing the Trump administration’s immigration 
policy and executive orders on immigration). 
155 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. N.B.D., 577 S.W.3d 73, 78 (Ky. 2019) (noting that Kentucky 
state courts have jurisdiction to make SIJS findings but are not required to engage in SIJS factfind-
ing); de Rubio v. Rubio Herrera, 541 S.W.3d 564, 571–73 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017) (finding that Missouri 
state courts were permitted to make SIJS findings but “federal law cannot mandate a state court to 
make findings,” and courts are only obligated to do so where they must act in the child’s best interest 
such that state courts would only make such findings in “the proper circumstances”); Ramirez v. Men-
jivar, No. 74030, 2018 Nev. Unpub. LEXIS 1203, at *5–6 (Dec. 27, 2018) (finding that Nevada dis-
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III. SIJS-HOSTILE STATES AND THEIR IMPERMISSIBLE  
EFFORTS TO BLOCK ACCESS TO SIJS RELIEF 
SIJS cases account for less than one percent of applications for lawful 
permanent status adjudicated by USCIS each year.156 The number of children 
who could potentially qualify for relief, however, is likely to be significantly 
higher than this figure given the risks associated with applying.157 Many chil-
dren remain in the shadows for fear that bringing a claim for a predicate order 
might expose them to adverse immigration consequences, or because they are 
unaware of or cannot afford legal representation to pursue this form of re-
lief.158 Politicized judicial attitudes toward unauthorized immigrants further 
                                                                                                                           
trict courts had jurisdiction to make SIJS findings “only to the extent those findings are ancillary to 
proceedings under state law,” and that courts are not required to make such findings and “may make 
findings relevant to an SIJ application only to the extent they are ancillary to proceedings under state 
law”); see also Canales v. Torres Orellana, 800 S.E.2d 208, 217 (Va. Ct. App. 2017) (finding that the 
SIJS statute “does not require that the state court make [findings required for a SIJS petition] or con-
vey jurisdiction upon them to do so”), superseded by statute, VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-241(A)(1) 
(2019), as recognized in Esmeralda v. Edmundo, No. JA2019-0000118, 2019 Va. Cir. LEXIS 440, at 
*2 (Cir. Ct. Aug. 29, 2019). 
156 See CTR. FOR GENDER & REFUGEE STUDIES & KIDS IN NEED OF DEF., A TREACHEROUS 
JOURNEY: CHILD MIGRANTS NAVIGATING THE U.S. IMMIGRATION SYSTEM 38 (2014). In 2012, for 
example, USCIS received only 2,959 SIJS petitions. Id. In 2014, USCIS received 5,776 petitions for 
SIJS status. See NUMBER OF I-360 PETITIONS TABLE, 2010–2019, supra note 121. The total number 
of successful applications for SIJS-lawful permanent resident status granted in 2017 was 4,681, out of 
1,127,167 total successful applications for permanent resident status (0.42%). See 2017 Yearbook of 
Immigration Statistics, Table 7: Persons Obtaining Lawful Permanent Resident Status by Type and 
Detailed Class of Admission: Fiscal Year 2017, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., https://www.dhs.gov/
immigration-statistics/yearbook/2017/table7 [https://perma.cc/F7TV-6Z6A]. 
157 See generally RACHEL PRANDINI & ALISON KAMHI, IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR., RISKS OF 
APPLYING FOR SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS (SIJS) IN AFFIRMATIVE CASES (Sept. 2018), 
https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/risks_apply_sijs_affirm_cases-20180831.pdf [https://
perma.cc/RZL2-JYVJ ] (describing the heightened risk of applying for SIJS since 2018 policy guid-
ance has required USCIS to refer applicants who are denied and who lack immigration status to ICE 
or to issue a Notice to Appear, which is the charging document that begins immigration removal pro-
ceedings). It is recommended that an affirmative SIJS packet should only be filed if the practitioner 
believes it will be granted, unless the applicant is willing to be placed in removal proceedings. Id. 
158 Recent USCIS memoranda have created new risks for SIJS applicants, who now have to 
weigh the likelihood of obtaining an adjustment to their immigration status with the risk of exposing 
themselves to immigration enforcement authorities since applying for SIJS is not a confidential pro-
cess. It is unclear when the guidance will be implemented. Nonetheless, advocates must engage in the 
risk analysis that the USCIS Notice to Appear (NTA) Memo now requires in all affirmative cases and 
advise their clients of the same. See, e.g., U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., POLICY MEMO-
RANDUM: UPDATED GUIDANCE FOR THE REFERRAL OF CASES AND ISSUANCE OF NOTICES TO AP-
PEAR (NTAS) IN CASES INVOLVING INADMISSIBLE AND DEPORTABLE ALIENS, PM-602-0050.1 (June 
28, 2018), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/2018/2018-06-28-PM-602-
0050.1-Guidance-for-Referral-of-Cases-and-Issuance-of-NTA.pdf [https://perma.cc/XS9G-B834]; U.S. 
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., UPDATED GUIDANCE ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF NOTICE TO 
APPEAR POLICY MEMORANDUM (July 30, 2018), https://www.uscis.gov/news/alerts/updated-guidance-
implementation-notice-appear-policy-memorandum [https://perma.cc/WB9N-F3FN] (announcing 
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restrain access to SIJS.159 Recent USCIS policy changes have further restricted 
access on the federal side, and state court judges have discovered creative 
ways to erect roadblocks to access as well. 
This Part first discusses the approach taken by states that have concluded 
that state court judges are not required under federal law to make SIJS factual 
findings during state court proceedings.160 We then present a critical analysis 
of the conceptualization of the SIJS statute. We argue that SIJS does not simp-
ly describe a form of relief available to children who may incidentally meet the 
criteria for it, but rather is better conceptualized as a federal right or a form of 
individual relief available to a group of children.161 States are not obligated to 
do anything other than what they already do—make best interest determina-
tions—and use existing “best-interests machinery” as a means for unauthorized 
immigrant children to access a form of immigration relief. In other words, in 
refusing to entertain a potential form of federal relief available to a child, a 
state court would appear not to appropriately discharge its obligation to act in 
that child’s best interest by ignoring a meaningful form of relief. 
Canales v. Torres Orellana, decided in the Court of Appeals of Virginia in 
2017, is the leading precedent to take this approach and, despite subsequently 
being superseded by state statute, it has influenced the judiciaries of several 
other states.162 Canales involved an immigrant juvenile living with his mother 
in Virginia.163 A lower court had granted custody to the juvenile’s mother but 
refused to make findings related to the father’s abuse and abandonment of his 
                                                                                                                           
USCIS postponement of the USCIS NTA Memo pending USCIS components to “create or update 
operational guidance on NTAs and Referrals to ICE”). 
159 See In re B.R.C.M., 182 So. 3d 749, 756, 763 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (Salter, J., dissenting) 
(“Florida appellate cases reported from 2005 to 2011 were receptive to immigrant juveniles petition-
ing for dependency . . . . From the elaboration of rulings in 2015 in this district . . . it is apparent that 
. . . the circuit court and this Court have concluded that private petitions by immigrant juveniles are 
generally appropriate for summary denial, despite the more deliberate consideration previously af-
forded the SIJ petitioners in [a circuit court case in] 2013 . . . and in prior opinions by the district 
courts of appeal.”), overruled by In re B.R.C.M. v. Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families, 215 So. 3d 
1219 (Fla. 2017); Perlmutter, supra note 17, at 1595 (discussing the shift in judicial response to SIJS 
petitions after the spread of fear of unaccompanied child migrant flow from Central America and 
noting that, “[i]n just a few years, judges’ attitudes changed from being receptive to the petitions to 
summarily dismissing them”); Ashley Cleek, Florida Judges Are Turning Their Backs on Abused 
Young Immigrants, THE NATION (Jan. 22, 2018), https://www.thenation.com/article/florida-judges-
are-turning-their-backs-on-abused-young-immigrants/ [https://web.archive.org/web/20200919201600/
https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/florida-judges-are-turning-their-backs-on-abused-young-
immigrants/]. 
160 See infra notes 162–179 and accompanying text. 
161 See infra notes 180–191 and accompanying text. 
162 800 S.E.2d 208, 220 (Va. Ct. App. 2017), superseded by statute, VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-
241(A)(1). 
163 Id. at 212–13. 
2902 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:2869 
son, claiming a lack of jurisdiction to do so.164 The court believed that the Im-
migration and Nationality Act (INA) must confer specific jurisdiction neces-
sary for a state court to make findings that might be used in an immigration 
matter, and that nothing in the INA mandated that state courts make SIJS find-
ings upon a litigant’s request.165 In spite of the court’s clear jurisdiction over the 
parental mistreatment and best-interests-of-the-child issues the case presented, it 
nevertheless held that it had no obligation to make independent SIJS findings 
because Virginia state law had no provision for making these findings.166 
In Canales, the court interpreted the SIJS statute as creating no obliga-
tion, mandate, or jurisdictional grant on behalf of the individual states, but in-
stead offered an alternative reading that “the SIJ definition only [operates as a] 
list[] [of] certain factors which, if established in state court proceedings, permit 
a juvenile immigrant to petition [USCIS] for SIJ status.”167 States following 
Canales support this interpretation with provisions from the USCIS Policy 
Manual, which (1) states that “[t]here is nothing in the [INA] that allows or 
directs juvenile courts to rely upon provisions of the INA or otherwise deviate 
from reliance upon state law and procedure in issuing state court orders” and 
(2) instructs state “[j]uvenile courts [to] follow their state laws on issues such 
as when to exercise their authority, evidentiary standards, and due process.”168 
Further reasoning in the case relies on the fact that Congress incorporated the 
SIJS scheme into the definitions section of the statute, stating that “it would 
strain basic principles of statutory construction to infer a grant of jurisdiction 
from the definition of a term of art.”169 
                                                                                                                           
164 Id. at 213. 
165 Id. at 218 (“Nothing in the INA directs a state court to do anything more than carry out its ad-
judicatory responsibilities under state law.”). 
166 Id. at 223 (holding that Virginia law does not permit circuit courts to make “separate SIJ find-
ings of fact”). 
167 Id. at 217. 
168 See id. at 217–18 (citing USCIS POLICY MANUAL, supra note 19, at chs. 1(A) n.1, 3(A)(2)); 
see also Commonwealth v. N.B.D., 577 S.W.3d 73, 78 (Ky. 2019) (citing same); Ramirez v. Men-
jivar, No. 74030, 2018 Nev. Unpub. LEXIS 1203, at *9–10 (Dec. 27, 2018) (citing same). 
169 Canales, 800 S.E.2d at 217. We find further evidence that the SIJS statute is, in fact, a manda-
tory program when we contrast the program to other schemes inviting states to participate in the im-
migration space. In the case of the 287(g) program, for example, the federal government invites states 
to elect to participate in cooperative efforts to provide law enforcement assistance to immigration 
authorities. The 287(g) program allows for partnerships between ICE and state and local law enforce-
ment agencies to identify and remove immigrants who are, according to ICE guidance, “amenable” to 
removal. See Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act, 
U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, https://www.ice.gov/287g [https://perma.cc/YZ33-M36E]. 
ICE provides training to local law enforcement that allows them to perform limited law enforcement 
functions. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2018). States and local agencies have the option to cooperate with 
federal immigration enforcement agencies, but the statute explicitly frames participation as a choice 
rather than an obligation. It thus reads: “Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to require any 
State or political subdivision of a State to enter into an agreement with the Attorney General under 
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In 2018, the Supreme Court of Nevada added a constitutional argument to 
the statutory analysis offered in Canales.170 In Ramirez v. Menjivar, the court 
declared that “refusing to infer a grant of jurisdiction under this term of art 
avoids possible constitutional issues under the Tenth Amendment and the sepa-
ration of powers doctrine.”171 In a footnote, the court expounded: 
For example, under the Tenth Amendment, “[t]he Federal Govern-
ment may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regu-
latory program.” Thus, even if the federal program contemplates the 
states’ participation, it cannot force the states to participate. Also at is-
sue is the separation of powers doctrine. Until recently, the Nevada 
Legislature was silent on what the state courts were required to do in 
regards to 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J). Because the Nevada Constitu-
tion grants the legislature with the power to establish family courts 
“as a division of any district court” and to “prescribe its jurisdiction,” 
inferring a grant of jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) would 
also likely encroach on the legislature’s exercise of power.172 
Missouri courts have also been in accord with this approach. In de Rubio 
v. Rubio Herrera, a 2017 case that was factually similar to Canales, the Court 
of Appeals of Missouri found that the SIJS statute did not impose—nor could it 
impose—an obligation for states to make SIJS findings, unless the court made 
findings incidentally in the normal course of resolving another matter already 
before the court.173 At issue in de Rubio was a custody determination, which 
required the court to make findings related to what was in the child’s best in-
terest.174 Yet the court refused to make additional special findings requested by 
the child’s mother that could have potentially qualified the child for special 
immigrant status.175 In so holding, the court stated: 
                                                                                                                           
this subsection.” 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(9). The SIJS statute, by contrast, contains no such “opt-out” 
language. We contrast these two statutes not for the purpose of endorsing 287(g) agreements, but 
simply for the purpose of contrasting the language and the implications of this language, and to pro-
vide additional evidence that the congressional intent of the SIJS statute is to mandate participation 
rather than create an option for states to participate. 
170 Ramirez, 2018 Nev. Unpub. LEXIS 1203, at *11. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. n.6 (citations omitted). 
173 541 S.W.3d 564, 571–73 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017) (finding that Missouri state courts were permit-
ted to make SIJS findings and may be obligated to make findings when the court has a duty to act in 
the child’s best interest, but “federal law cannot mandate a state court to make findings,” and, thus, 
state courts would only make such findings in “the proper circumstances”). 
174 Id. at 568. 
175 Id. at 573. 
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In the proper circumstances, a court exercising jurisdiction over an 
immigrant child may, while acting in parens patriae, find it neces-
sary to make the findings at issue herein. That obligation arises nei-
ther from federal law or regulation, nor from the request of a liti-
gant, but solely from that judicial officer’s obligation to act in the 
best interest of that child. Depending upon the facts found by the 
state court to support its judgment in any of the above proceedings, 
such findings could arguably also support a decision to grant SIJ sta-
tus, but, as noted, that is for the federal authorities to decide. Our 
reading of the SIJ statute is in accordance with the analysis in 
Canales, which is consistent with the idea that federal law cannot 
mandate a state court to make findings but may rely on state courts 
in the proper circumstances to make such findings that are in a 
child’s best interest and required of the court while in the position of 
in loco parentis.176 
After concluding that the trial court had no obligation to make findings 
that could qualify the child for SIJS, the appeals court then turned to the moth-
er’s equal protection claim, summarily disposing of the claim with a complete 
lack of reasoning, stating that “it is abundantly clear that the trial court’s deci-
sion was not based ‘solely’ upon [the] [m]other’s immigration status.”177 Yet, 
at the conclusion of the hearing, the judge stated that “he could not justify 
making arrangements for or suggesting that an undocumented minor should 
stay in the United States when that minor does not have a parent in the United 
States who is a legal citizen.”178 Thus, it seems at least plausible from the rec-
ord that the judge’s reasoning for denying the mother’s motion to make special 
findings that could have assisted her son in applying for SIJS was related to 
her undocumented status. It also seems clear that the trial judge either did not 
understand or was unwilling to comply with the SIJS statute. But the court 
dismissed the mother’s equal protection claim because the court was “con-
cerned only with the correctness of the result, not the route taken to reach that 
result.”179 
Courts have historically shied away from tackling discrimination con-
cerns directly in favor of implicitly meshing federalism and equal protection 
together.180 One can choose to downplay this trend in the caselaw, as long as 
                                                                                                                           
176 Id. 
177 Id. at 575. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. 
180 See GULASEKARAM & RAMAKRISHNAN, supra note 62, at 187 (discussing a line of cases, 
starting in the late nineteenth century, that have intermingled federalism concepts with discriminatory 
origins and effects of state and local restrictive laws); see, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 
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the judicial reasoning reaches the normatively desirable result. Intermingling 
these principles too closely, however, can have far-reaching consequences, 
eroding both the doctrine of equal protection and, accordingly, immigrant 
rights. Using preemption and federalism concerns as the dispositive rationale 
gives the impression that restrictive state and local laws are legitimate but for 
their overreaching of federal power when, more often, they are designed and 
carried out with discriminatory intent and replete with racial profiling prob-
lems in practice.181 Other scholars have outlined the details and merits of mak-
ing an equal protection claim under the SIJS statute, as well as the potential 
negative side effects advancing such a claim might expose (the biggest risk 
likely being the potential for invalidating the entire SIJS framework). There-
fore, we will limit our commentary to merely identifying the potential for an 
equal protection claim.182 
Although there are plenty of state judiciaries that have proven hostile to 
SIJS applicants and the SIJS statutory scheme, we are not aware of any states 
                                                                                                                           
377, 378 (1971) (finding that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prevented a 
state from conditioning welfare benefits on possession of citizenship or the beneficiary residing in 
United States for a certain number of years, but emphasizing that “[t]he National Government has 
‘broad constitutional powers in determining what aliens shall be admitted to the United States, the 
period they may remain, regulation of their conduct before naturalization, and the terms and condi-
tions of their naturalization,’” and holding that “[s]tate laws that restrict the eligibility of aliens for 
welfare benefits merely because of their alienage conflict with these overriding national policies in an 
area constitutionally entrusted to the Federal Government” (quoting Takahashi v. Fish & Game 
Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948)); Takahashi, 334 U.S. at 414–15 (finding that a state could not 
refuse to supply petitioner, an alien ineligible for citizenship because of federal law, with a commer-
cial fishing license because such refusal violated the Fourteenth Amendment, but viewing questions 
raised as being “of importance in [both] the fields of federal-state relationships and of constitutionally 
protected individual equality and liberty”); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 65–66 (1941) (finding 
that the Pennsylvania Alien Registration Act is field preempted by the federal statutory scheme re-
garding alien registration, but discussing at length discriminatory impact of the Act on aliens); Truax 
v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 43 (1915) (finding that an Arizona state law requiring at least 80% of employ-
er’s workforce to be U.S. citizens violated the Fourteenth Amendment because the authority to control 
immigration was vested solely in the federal government and the state was acting to deny some lawful 
inhabitants their right to earn a living); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (striking down 
a facially neutral municipal laundry ordinance on equal protection ground but citing Chy Lung v. 
Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1875), a seminal structural preemption case, suggesting that the Court under-
stood that, although decided on federal preemption ground, law at issue in Chy Lung had discriminato-
ry purpose). 
181 See GULASEKARAM & RAMAKRISHNAN, supra note 62, at 187; HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMI-
GRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW 111–16 (2014). 
182 For a detailed discussion of equal protection violations under the SIJS statute and the potential 
for an equal protection challenge to the SIJS law, see generally Rebecca A. Delfino, The Equal Pro-
tection Doctrine in the Age of Trump: The Example of Undocumented Immigrant Children, 84 
BROOK. L. REV. 73 (2018) (citing the failure or impracticability of traditional methods aimed at solv-
ing problems with the implementation of the SIJS statute—like amending SIJS or revising implement-
ing regulations—because of a stalemate within and between the executive and legislative branches, as 
reasons for advancing a constitutional challenge to the framework). 
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that have, as of yet, specifically blocked access to SIJS directly via statute. 
Certainly, challenging state laws or local ordinances that restrict access to SIJS 
is viable, to the extent such laws exist. Obstacles to the realization of the bene-
fits of the SIJS statute have, however, surfaced in less conspicuous, more insid-
ious ways. 
Perhaps the most ironic and lamentable roadblock to SIJS access is found 
in the attitudes of some judges. Widespread misinterpretation of the SIJS stat-
ute and state law has severely limited access to SIJS over the past decade just 
as ominous predictions of floods of children entering the United States through 
Mexico from Central America have taken hold in the popular, and judicial, im-
agination.183 Bernard Perlmutter, a seasoned clinic director and litigator at 
University of Miami School of Law, recently drafted a field study offering his 
perspective on the judicial skepticism around granting SIJS predicate orders 
and the undercurrents of anti-immigrant sentiment seeping into recent trial rul-
ings and appellate opinions in Florida.184 In the absence of the option to chal-
lenge unconstitutional ordinances, he offers strategies his clinic has deployed 
to expose and counter judges whose misperceptions of immigrants, and nation-
al immigration policy views, impacted their rulings from the bench or may 
have scared children into not applying for SIJS factual findings in the first 
place.185 One strategy was to meet with and counsel individual judges who had 
reported undocumented children to immigration authorities after they appeared 
in their courtrooms to petition for SIJS findings.186 His clinic educated judges 
on the purpose of SIJS and clarified that his role was not, as he had originally 
viewed it, as a “de facto immigration judge,” but instead as a juvenile court 
judge acting in the best interest of the immigrant children appearing before 
him.187 Perlmutter effected change through educating law school students, 
judges, lawyers, and policymakers, collaborating with other advocates, reach-
ing out to the media, and telling clients’ stories to the courts.188 
Judicial court battles have prompted, in some cases, a greater sense of ur-
gency on the part of state legislatures to create jurisdiction where state courts 
have interpreted the SIJS statute to convey none. In Virginia, for example, as 
                                                                                                                           
183 See Perlmutter, supra note 17, at 1596. 
184 See generally id. Florida has adopted laws and policies that aim to assist and encourage SIJS 
applicants, but such efforts can, obviously, be undermined by misinformed or even decidedly anti-
immigrant judges. Id. 
185 Id. 
186 Id. at 1582–93. 
187 Id. at 1590. 
188 Id. at 1613–26. Examples of Perlmutter’s work include participating in Florida Department of 
Children and Families rulemaking, updating the clinic SIJS Bench Book, inviting USCIS policy spe-
cialists to train Florida dependency judges on SIJS, and developing strategies and best practices for 
seeking best interest orders in probate court. 
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noted supra, the legislature created a “fix” for Canales by granting jurisdiction 
to juvenile and domestic relations courts to make specific findings of fact re-
quired by federal law to enable a child to apply for or receive any state or fed-
eral benefit.189 Nonetheless, not all states have followed suit in creating a legis-
lative fix to court decisions that have limited access to SIJS relief. In states 
where courts refuse to recognize that Congress mandates them to make SIJS 
findings, courts tragically, and impermissibly, deny children access to this form 
of relief. 
When Congress invokes its plenary power to regulate borders, as it has in 
the case of the enactment of the SIJS statute, it has already created any juris-
diction necessary for litigants to petition a state court to make SIJS factual 
findings. State legislation aiming to create a cause of action requiring judges to 
hear SIJS cases is unnecessary, although understandable in the current political 
climate where immigration is a hot-button issue and where some judges may 
either fail to understand or intend to thwart the SIJS legislative scheme.190 A 
federal “right” to relief has already created jurisdiction. This is a crucial dis-
tinction that goes a long way toward immunizing the statute from a Tenth 
Amendment challenge. Despite a general trend towards dismissing claims al-
leging violations of state sovereignty, directly commandeering or controlling 
state legislative or executive officials and resources is the one remaining area 
where state sovereignty claims still have purchase under the Tenth Amend-
ment.191 If one conceptualizes the SIJS statute as a federal right accorded to a 
group of immigrants as an appropriate congressional exercise of plenary pow-
er, the concerns surrounding commandeering are alleviated somewhat. 
Now that we have discussed the ways states have opted to handle SIJS, as 
well as an evaluation of the permissibility of these approaches, we propose a 
model of federalism that can help address the concerns of state and federal ac-
tors and, hopefully, eliminate some of the conceptual confusion that has 
plagued the implementation of the SIJS statute. 
                                                                                                                           
189 VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-241(A)(1) (2020). 
190 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 155 (Deering 2019). This law, among other things, clari-
fied that family courts have jurisdiction to make the findings necessary for SIJS. Id. 
191 See, e.g., Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1478 (2018) (finding 
that a federal prohibition against a state authorization of sports gambling violated the anti-comman-
deering rule because it unequivocally dictated what state legislature may and may not do); Printz v. 
United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (striking down as unconstitutional a detailed federal scheme 
that governed distribution of firearms but directed state law enforcement officers to participate in its 
administration). 
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IV. A COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM MODEL FOR THE SIJS STATUTE 
Federalism concerns shift as an applicant proceeds through the SIJS appli-
cation process. When an applicant petitions a state court for SIJS findings, states 
may get concerned about sovereignty.192 When the applicant petitions the USCIS 
for SIJS status, USCIS may question state jurisdiction. Ultimately, both reactions 
inappropriately block access to SIJS and undercut or bypass congressional pro-
tections for applicants. There is no basis for states to refuse to make factual find-
ings under the SIJS statute. Similarly, there is no basis for USCIS to second-
guess the application of state law or jurisdiction when reviewing an SIJS appli-
cation.193 This Part will propose a workable model of cooperative federalism to 
address existing impermissible expressions of state and federal agency power.194 
Section A lays out our cooperative federalism and concurrent jurisdiction ap-
proach to the issue.195 Section B posits that the legal framework of SIJS could 
embody a working model of cooperative federalism.196 
A. A Cooperative Federalism Framework and Concurrent Jurisdiction 
This Section explores our proposed concept of cooperative federalism.197 
Ming Chen provides a useful framework for resolving immigration-related 
conflict.198 She argues for an approach that could allow for state engagement 
while preserving the federal interests central to immigration law.199 Applica-
tion of a model that espouses a cooperative form of immigration federalism 
requires first that we identify existing nuances in immigration law.200 More 
specifically, we are referring to the difference between regulating core func-
tions of immigration law (“border laws”) and regulating in the space of the 
day-to-day affairs of undocumented persons present in the United States (laws 
that operate “between borders”).201 Identifying the character of the law helps to 
guide our analysis; for example, reliance on the plenary power doctrine to 
usurp state power may be justified to the extent that the law is a primary law 
                                                                                                                           
192 See supra notes 94–191 and accompanying text. 
193 To be clear, the USCIS does have to “consent[] to the grant of special immigrant juvenile sta-
tus,” but the statute does not permit the USCIS to question the findings and determinations of the state 
courts. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i)–(iii) (2018). 
194 See infra notes 197–217 and accompanying text. 
195 See infra notes 197–212 and accompanying text. 
196 See infra notes 213–217 and accompany text. 
197 See infra notes 198–212 and accompanying text. 
198 Chen, Immigration and Cooperative Federalism, supra note 22, at 1094. 
199 Id. 
200 Id. at 1092. 
201 Id. at 1092–94. 
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operating in the zone at the border, and considerably less appropriate to the 
extent the law operates in the secondary space between borders. 
Ming Chen’s framework harmonizes immigration federalism with the 
principles of cooperative federalism.202 Cooperative federalism envisions fed-
eral and state governments sharing power over certain areas, permitting coop-
eration within those areas.203 When cooperative federalism is appropriate, 
harmonization would require the usual presumptions of concurrent jurisdiction 
and shared power between state and federal government.204 To the extent that a 
law can be fairly characterized as a border law, moderating entry and exit, the 
plenary power doctrine could be clearly invoked so that federal law would 
override state law.205 If plenary power justifications are not clearly presented, 
however, a preemption analysis would consider the possibility that Congress 
envisioned a system of shared power and cooperation, as was certainly the case 
in the SIJS statute.206 If there is apparent conflict, courts should take an addi-
tional step of considering the state’s purpose in effectuating a law in addition 
to the federal purpose.207 If the purpose is cooperative, the law would more 
likely withstand scrutiny.208 
Federal law is as much the law of the several states as are the laws passed 
by their legislatures. 
Federal and state law “together form one system of jurisprudence, 
which constitutes the law of the land for the State; and the courts of 
the two jurisdictions are not foreign to each other, nor to be treated 
                                                                                                                           
202 Id. 
203 See, e.g., Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative Federalism, 
79 N.C. L. REV. 663, 665 (2001). 
204 Chen, Immigration and Cooperative Federalism, supra note 22, at 1092. 
205 Id. 
206 Id. at 1093. 
207 Id. 
208 Id.; see also Charlton C. Copeland, Federal Law in State Court: Judicial Federalism Through 
a Relational Lens, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 511, 525 (2011). Copeland rejects allocation as the 
exclusive method of federalism enforcement and proposes relational federalism enforcement, the 
judicial mediation of the interaction of the national government and state governments that is ground-
ed in the recognition that the Constitution establishes an enduring relationship between states and the 
national government. Copeland, supra, at 511–12. In short, rather than view federalism as governing 
how power is allocated between distant and discrete sovereigns, Copeland takes a more nuanced and 
pragmatic view, informed by how federal and state governments actually interact in the modern era 
and their intertwined interdependent relationship. Id. at 512. Informed by such an attitude, courts 
would, we believe, appreciate Congress’s attempts in the SIJS statute to acknowledge and shape coop-
eration between the states and the national government rather than viewing the statute in terms of its 
perceived threat to state and/or federal sovereignty. 
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by each other as such, but as courts of the same country, having ju-
risdiction partly different and partly concurrent.”209 
So strong is this presumption that it can be defeated only in two narrow 
circumstances: (1) when Congress expressly ousts state courts of jurisdiction, 
and (2) when a state court refuses jurisdiction because of a neutral state rule 
regarding the administration of the courts.210 Thus, “although States retain sub-
stantial leeway to establish the contours of their judicial systems, they lack 
authority to nullify a federal right or cause of action they believe is incon-
sistent with their local policies.”211 The presumption that federal law binds 
state court judges is grounded textually in the Supremacy Clause, although 
virtually all Supreme Court opinions have grounded this concurrent jurisdic-
tion as implicit in our system of dual sovereigns.212 
B. The SIJS Statutory Scheme as an Example of Cooperative Federalism 
This Section applies the normative principles we identified supra to the 
SIJS statutory regime.213 Characterizing the nature of the SIJS statutory 
scheme as relating to “core” or “non-core” immigration functions is an inquiry 
crucial to making determinations of which state laws can coexist with the 
scheme, and which state laws operate to impede congressional statutory intent. 
The characterization of the SIJS scheme is exactly what makes application of a 
cooperative model challenging: the two-step statutory dance Congress envi-
sioned for SIJS determinations seems to invoke both border laws and laws that 
operate between borders. The SIJS scheme invokes border law because the 
very essence of the SIJS immigration benefit goes to the heart of Congress’s 
role in immigration matters: the admission and removal function. Yet, it also 
implicates law between borders because the process for gaining access to SIJS 
benefits depends on the core state functions of family law and best-interest-of-
the-child determinations. At least in academic discourse, the use of the plenary 
power doctrine to justify federal primacy over border laws generates much less 
                                                                                                                           
209 Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 734–35 (2009) (quoting Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 
136–37 (1876)). In Haywood, N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 24 (LexisNexis 2020) was held unconstitutional 
under the Supremacy Clause. 556 U.S. at 742. A prisoner who had sought damages under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 in New York state court had his claim dismissed for want of jurisdiction and was left, instead, 
to pursue a claim for damages in a court of limited jurisdiction and against an entirely different party 
(the State) under section 24. Id. at 732. The State’s policy was contrary to Congress’s judgment that 
all persons who violate federal rights while acting under color of state law are liable for damages 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 736–37. 
210 See Howlett ex rel. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 372 (1990); Claflin, 93 U.S. at 136. 
211 Haywood, 556 U.S. at 736. 
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controversy than the use of plenary power to usurp state power vis-à-vis laws 
between borders (i.e., traditional state functions).214 In this case, SIJS could be 
thought of as an expression of federal power that is wholly dependent on tradi-
tional state power for procedural execution. 
But application of Chen’s model of cooperative federalism does not com-
pletely assuage the inherent federalism tensions built into the SIJS statute. SIJS 
lacks the characteristics needed for easy classification in Chen’s binary model 
because it is not exclusively a border law nor is it exclusively a law between 
borders. When an applicant petitions a state court judge for SIJS findings, it 
looks like a law between borders, but when the applicant petitions USCIS for 
SIJS status, the law looks more like a border law. If we conceptualize the stat-
ute as a border law that simply requires state assistance to operationalize, then 
only the federal government could regulate in this space. The wrinkle here, 
however, is that Congress instructed states to participate in the procedure re-
quired to access this “core function” immigration benefit. States have no obli-
gation to expand SIJS access consistent with federal standards, but if they 
choose to, USCIS cannot second-guess cooperative efforts to allow more ap-
plicants to access SIJS benefits. 
Chen’s model can still work, albeit with modifications. One can imagine 
the SIJS statute as an expression of plenary power because its dominant objec-
tive is to regulate the entry, exit, and naturalization path of certain children. By 
extension, state courts function as the “bridge” connecting this group to the 
relief Congress afforded them. The bridge may be longer or steeper in certain 
states, producing variation in accessibility, but states cannot dismantle it com-
pletely. In other words, states have an affirmative duty to hear SIJS fact-
finding cases. If the applicant does not present facts sufficient to meet re-
quirements for SIJS, USCIS may request more information.215 If the applicant 
obtains a state predicate order that meets SIJS statutory requirements, USCIS 
cannot second-guess the state law or jurisdiction to deny SIJS relief.216 
Thus, we proceed under the theory that overcoming the presumption of 
concurrent jurisdiction is a difficult task; accordingly, state court judges have 
not only the authority but, indeed, the obligation to make SIJS findings using 
appropriate state law principles. Thus, insofar as the overarching aim of the 
                                                                                                                           
214 Core immigration functions (removal and admission) are more appropriate exercises of plena-
ry power as compared to alienage laws where plenary power may yield to traditional state powers. See 
generally Chen, Immigration and Cooperative Federalism, supra note 22. 
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SIJS statute is to regulate borders (by providing relief to certain immigrants 
who meet certain requirements), state courts are required, by way of Con-
gress’s plenary power, to exercise concurrent jurisdiction to make SIJS find-
ings. How courts apply their state law to regulate immigrants’ everyday af-
fairs—areas relating to education, housing, drivers’ licenses, health care, and, 
in the case of what we are concerned with here, child welfare—is an exercise 
of traditional state powers that federal immigration agencies cannot ques-
tion.217 
Cooperative state legislative efforts that align with congressional statutory 
intent should be upheld under such a model. If state legislation expands access 
to SIJS beyond congressional statutory intent, it could be preempted on obsta-
cle conflict grounds (although these may go unchallenged because USCIS has 
the final word on the substantive grant of SIJS relief), and state laws that oper-
ate to block access to courts for SIJS applicants, based on their status alone, 
could potentially be invalidated on either obstacle conflict preemption grounds 
or equal protection grounds. 
CONCLUSION 
Conceptualizing the SIJS statute using a cooperative federalism frame-
work best approximates Congress’s original intent and can further provide an 
ideal paradigm for dual sovereigns operating in step toward the common goal 
of providing relief to an identifiable and vulnerable group of children. But 
when federal or state actors violate the statutory framework in ways that im-
permissibly restrict access to SIJS, the cooperative hybrid no longer functions 
as intended and children suffer as a direct result. Entry at the border may be an 
immigrant child’s first contact with immigration authorities, but their journey 
continues long after crossing into the United States. Their chosen state of resi-
dence as well as the political leanings of the incumbent White House admin-
istration will have considerable and direct impacts on them. The cooperative 
federalism model proposed herein can help resolve tensions and correct mis-
understandings surrounding the SIJS statute, but only when federal agencies do 
not exceed the authority vested in them, and when states and federal agents 
alike have understood the SIJS statute as conferring a federal right to appli-
cants. This approach offers both a pragmatic and constructive model for re-
solving current federalism tensions (while affording apposite respect to both 
federal and state authorities), attends to the immigration issues that arise both 
at the border and within, and most importantly, best protects the group of chil-
dren Congress originally identified as so desperately in need of our assistance. 
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